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L Introduction
On December 13, 1994, American Eagle Flight 3379 crashed near
Raleigh-Durham International Airport, killing fifteen people on board.
After a ten-month probe, the National Transportation Safety Board con-
cluded that the plane's captain made several mistakes immediately before
the plane crashed. Among other things, the pilot misread a warning light
on the instrument panel and then improperly handled the aircraft. Prior to
seeking employment with American Eagle, the pilot had resigned from
another airline to avoid being fired for failing a critical flight test. The
pilot's former employer never conveyed this information to American
Eagle. When queried about its failure to obtain the critical information,
American Eagle responded that it "strongly believes" airlines should share
information about pilots when they apply for jobs. American Eagle admit-
ted, however, that it never shares information about its own pilots. The
company said that it feared being sued by employees who want their
records to be kept private. As a result, American Eagle has asked Con-
gress to enact legislation that would give airlines immunity from such
lawsuits.1
As illustrated above, during the past decade employers have become
increasingly reluctant to discuss the qualifications of former employees with
prospective employers for fear of defamation and other lawsuits. We
1. See James Rosen & Craig Whitlock, Pilot Faulted in RDU Crash, NEws &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Oct. 25, 1995, at IA.
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believe that the consequences of these so-called "no reference" policies2 are
disastrous, and we see a strong need to reinstate the free flow of informa-
tion among employers. In addition to the American Eagle tragedy,3 we
offer two other recent examples to illustrate the point.
In 1993, a former employee of the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company
in Florida shot three executives to death. In a subsequent lawsuit (settled
out of court), plaintiffs alleged that the employee's former employer,
Allstate Insurance Company, despite abundant evidence of the employee's
violent tendencies, provided a neutral reference because of both the fear of
the former employee's violent tendencies and the specter of being sued in
connection with a negative reference.4
2. This phenomenon and its consequences have been discussed in a number of law
journal articles over the last decade. See generally Celeste L. Frank, Providing References
on Employees Today, 55 TEX. B.J. 132 (1992); John Bruce Lewis et al., Defamation and
the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 MO. L. REV. 797 (1989);
David C. Martin & Kathryn M. Bartol, Potential Libel and Slander Issues Involving
Discharged Employees, 13 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 43 (1987); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven
L. Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise of Employment References, 30 AM.
Bus. L.J. 123 (1992); Robert A. Prentice & Brenda J. Winslett, Employee References: Will
a "No Comment" Policy Protect Employers Against Liability for Defamation?, 25 AM. Bus.
L. J. 207 (1987); 0. Lee Reed & Jan W. Henkel, Facilitating the Flow of Truthful Person-
nel Information: Some Needed Change in the Standard Required to Overcome the Qualified
Privilege to Defame, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 305 (1988); Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws
Governing Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for
Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 45 (1995); Valerie L. Acoff, Note, References Available
Upon Request ... Not! - Employers Are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job Refer-
ences, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 755 (1994); Ann M. Barry, Comment, Defamation in the
Workplace: The Impact of Increasing Employer Liability, 72 MARQ. L. REv. 264 (1989);
Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining
References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 687 (1989);
Edward R. Horkan, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and Employment
References, 79 VA. L. REv. 517 (1993); Pamela G. Posey, Note, Employer Defamation: The
Role of Qualified Privilege, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469 (1989); Kyle E. Skopic, Com-
ment, Potential Employer Liability for Employee References, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 427
(1987); Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer Liabil-
ity, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1645 (1991); Charles D. Tiefer, Comment, Qualified Privilege to
Defame Employees and Credit Applicants, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 143 (1977); Debora
K. Kristensen, Employment Defamation: Employer Liability - Up, First Amendment
Privileges - Down, BARRISTER, Fall 1994, at 29; see also infra note 11 (listing news and
business articles discussing issue).
3. For other airline tragedies involving incompetent pilots whose former employers
failed to pass on records of incompetence, see A.G. Newmeyer, H, Hiring in the Dark: The
Reference Sham, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at A23, and Julie Schmit & John Ritter,
Marginal Pilots Put Passengers'Lives at Risk, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 1995, at Al.
4. See Jemer v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 93-09472 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993) (unreported),
cited in David E. Rovella, Laws May Ease the Risky Business of Job References, NAT'L
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In 1990, the estate of a Michigan nursing home employee who had
been savagely beaten and murdered by a co-worker sued the co-worker's
former employer, alleging that the former employer negligently failed to
divulge to the prospective employer information about the employee's
violent behavior.' At trial, the former employer freely conceded that,
despite its knowledge of the employee's dangerous nature, it followed its
policy of disclosing to prospective employers only the dates of employment
of a former employee.' The former employer had instituted this policy to
avoid the possibility of lawsuits. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals reluctantly concluded that the law recognizes no duty on the part of
an employer to divulge negative information about a former employee.7
Regrettably, although the former employers of these dangerous em-
ployees possessed records that might have prevented these tragedies, the
employers refused to disclose this information to the prospective
employers - nor did they have to do so. At present, the law neither
provides incentives for employers to pass on information, whether positive
or negative,' about former employees9 nor imposes a duty to disclose such
information."0 Indeed, the thrust of the law has worked against society's
L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at B1.
5. See Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 101-02 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1990).
6. Id. at 102.
7. Id. at 102-03.
8. See id. at 102 (noting that "[t]here is ... nothing about the conditional privilege
which magically transposes it into a legal obligation requiring employers to disclose adverse
information concerning a former employee").
9. To the contrary, as we shall discuss, an employer that does give a reference on
a former employee may find itself subject to a lawsuit raising a number of tort theories:
defamation, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, negligent referral,
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See infra notes 52-197
and accompanying text (discussing various employee causes of action). The employer may
also find itself subject to liability on a number of federal statutory claims including charges
of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment against persons
because of race, sex, religion, color, or national origin), the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against persons
because of age), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals because of person's disability),
to name a few. Further, an employer also may face lawsuits based on state privacy and
"antiblacklisting" statutes as well as "state service" letter laws. See infra notes 38-49 and
accompanying text (discussing statutorily based causes of action).
10. The consequence of an absence of a duty to disclose information about a former
employee is clearly demonstrated in Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d
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interest in having such information disclosed. During the past ten years,
employers have adopted strict nondisclosure policies regarding requests for
references on former employees in hopes of avoiding costly lawsuits.'
The current reluctance of employers to provide references originates
in the explosion of federal employee rights laws over the last several
decades'2 coupled with a proliferation of state privacy laws.'3 The concur-
100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing Moore).
The Moore court found that the former employer, even knowing of the employee's murder-
ous propensities, had no duty to disclose this information in the absence of foreseeability.
Moore, 459 N.W.2d at 103; see also infra notes 262-313 and accompanying text (discussing
employer duties).
11. See, e.g., SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 1995 REFERENCE
CHECKING SURVEY (noting that 635 respondents stated that they or their staff had refused
to give references for fear of lawsuit); Ross H. Fishman, When Silence Is Golden; Providing
Employment References, NATION'S BUS., July 1991, at 48, 49 ("It is widely believed that
the safest and most conservative position is to refuse to provide references."); D. Scott
Landry & Randy Hoffman, Walking the Fine Line on Employee Job Reference Information,
LA. B.J., Feb. 1996, at 457 ("In recent years, many employers, including many law firms,
have adopted strict non-disclosure policies regarding former employees in order to avoid
costly lawsuits."); Michael R. Losey, Reference-Checking Protocols Leave Everyone in the
Dark, MANAGING OFF. TECH., Nov. 1995, at 33 ("Today, due to an alarming increase in
legal threats, too many firms have tight-lipped policies when it comes to giving refer-
ences."); Phillip M. Perry, Cut Your Law Practice's Risks When Giving References for
Former Support Staff, LAw PRAC. MGMT., Sept. 1994, at 54 (quoting Vincent J. Appraises,
then chair of the American Bar Association's Labor and Employment Law Section: "We tell
our clients not to get involved in references of any kind. Just confirm or deny whether the
person has been employed for a particular period of time and that's it. End of discussion.");
Terry Boyd, Mum's the Word on Ex-Employee Job References, Bus. FIRST (Louisville), Oct.
23, 1995, at 1 ("For more and more companies, giving out employee references is becoming
a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' dilemma. With suits over job references
mounting, attorneys and executives say fewer businesses will say anything when queried
about ex-employees."); Tamar Lewin, Boss Can Be Sued for Saying Too Much, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1987, at B26 ("Many employers have become so frightened of... lawsuits that
they will no longer provide references, but will only confirm a worker's dates of employ-
ment and job title."); Frances A. MeMorris, Ex-Bosses Face Less Peril Giving Honest Job
References, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1996, at B1; Newmeyer, supra note 3 ("Many employers
have adopted the NRSN approach - giving name-rank-serial-number-type information about
former employees."); see also Prentice & Winslett, supra note 2, at 207; Saxton, supra note
2, at 45; Horkan, supra note 2, at 517.
12. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210L-12213 (1994).
13. For a thorough discussion of workplace privacy rights, see IAN MICHAEL SHEPARD
Er AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY: EMPLOYEE TESTING, SURVEILLANCE, WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
AND OTHER AREAS OF VULNERABILITY (BNA Special Report No. 133, 2d ed. 1987).
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rent corporate retrenchment of the late 1980s and the early 1990s has also
created employer fears that middle managers pushed out the door will step
into the courtroom. Finally, a number of large jury verdicts in the mid-
1980s in employee tort actions over defamatory references has fed the
reluctance to say anything about former employees.14
A number of recent surveys have confirmed employer reluctance to
provide references. In 1995, the Society for Human Resource Management
conducted a survey of more than 1300 human resource managers to deter-
mine the frequency of employer reference-checking."5 Sixty-three percent
of the respondents stated that they or members of their organization had
refused to provide information about former employees for fear of being
sued. 6 Nearly forty percent stated that human resource professionals
should refuse to provide job-related information to prospective employers,
even if the information was honest and factual.17 This was so even though
only seventeen percent had ever been challenged by a disgruntled former
employee alleging that the organization had provided an inaccurate refer-
ence. 8 Paradoxically, almost three-quarters of the respondents stated that
reference-checking was more important in seeking to hire the best possible
employees than ever before. 9
Two other recent surveys also demonstrate the magnitude of the
problem. In a 1993 study," two-thirds of the two hundred executives
surveyed by Robert Half International stated that companies are providing
less information during reference-checks than three years ago, while eighty
14. See generally, e.g., Sigal Const. Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204 (D.C. 1991)
(awarding former construction project manager $250,000 for defamation when his former
employer abused qualified privilege); Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.
App. 1984) (awarding insurance salesman $1.9 million for defamatory remarks made by his
employer in which he was unfairly called, among other things, "a zero"). The notoriety of
such lawsuits has led many employers to conclude that they face a "litigation explosion."
Although these concerns are real, they are probably exaggerated. See infra notes 224-29
and accompanying text.
15. See generally SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 1995 REFERENCE




19. Id. Interestingly, only two percent of those responding stated that they actually
had been sued for negligent hiring because they hired an individual who later harmed
another employee or who committed a crime while an employee. Id.
20. Robert Half International, Inc., Survey Shows Employers Find It Harder to Check
References, Jan. 1993 (Press Release) [hereinafter Robert Half Survey]; see also Saxton,
supra note 2, at 45-46 (discussing Robert Half Survey).
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percent of them indicated that they sometimes gave excessively positive
references because of the fear of lawsuits.21 Additionally, in 1993 a survey
of two dozen Fortune 500 companies found that none currently provided
references.' As justification for this information withholding, an attorney
for a management law firm bluntly stated, "[p]eople are litigation-happy, and
lawyers help stir the pot."'
Although states recently have begun to enact so-called "shield laws" that
protect employers that provide job references,' and a number of scholars
have recommended reforms to the current common law,21 our review of the
statutes and of the proposed recommendations leads us to conclude that none
of these proposals adequately addresses the problem. In order to encourage
the free flow of information between past and prospective employers, this
Article recommends the adoption of a series of measures to assuage the fear
of large tort damages for employers that give job references.
In support of our recommendations, we first examine the contraction of
employer rights in connection with reference-checking that has occurred over
the last several decades. We then discuss the multitude of torts that surround
the giving of references - most notably, defamation, employer interference
with employee economic advantage, employer liability for negligent misrep-
resentation or intentional misrepresentation, and finally, negligent hiring.
Further, we analyze the shield laws adopted by a large number of states to
address the employee-reference problem and discuss the implications of the
recommendations of others in this area. Finally, we recommend an adminis-
trative Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) system to provide an expedi-
tious, fair, and inexpensive method of resolving employer-reference disputes.
Our concern is to restore the social balance that has become tilted in the
last decade toward protecting employee rights at the expense of the interests
of society. Although we wholeheartedly support workers rights, we believe
that the rights of the individual worker need to be tempered in the interests
of the health and safety of the public.
21. Robert Half Survey, supra note 20.
22. See Tim Weiner, Companies Stop Giving References, FRESNO BEE, June 7, 1993,
at C4 (discussing survey conducted by Alan Schonberg, chief executive officer of Manage-
ment Recruiters International of Cleveland).
23. Id.
24. See McMorris, supra note 11 (discussing fact that 25 states have passed some form
of laws providing employers with protection from defamation for releasing information about
former employees); see also infra notes 198-210, 331-43, and accompanying text (discussing
shield laws).
25. See supra note 2 (listing scholarship proposing reform).
1388
"NO COMMENT" POLICIES: A REFORM PROPOSAL
IL The Contraction of Employer Rights and the Rise of
No-Reference Policies
Some commentators have suggested that today's climate of employer
caution in providing references is a consequence of the evolution of em-
ployee rights, a trend that has involved both modifications of the common
law and increases in legislative protection of employees. ' Although much
of this evolution has been necessary to assure employees a significant mea-
sure of equality in the workplace, it has also made it more difficult for
employers to operate in a fair and efficient manner. We briefly review
developments in this area.
A. The Erosion of the Employment At-Will Doctrine
The erosion of the employment at-will doctrine has been one of the most
important developments in employment law over the last several decades.
The erosion has taken place through the emergence of a host of common-law
exceptions that now make it more difficult for employers to discharge
employees.' Pursuant to these exceptions, employees now commonly
recover damages upon proof that their discharge resulted from violations of
an implied contract,' was in violation of the exercise of a statutory right,29
26. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 2, at 264-65. ("The development of workplace privacy
rights has caused a dramatic increase in the number of defamation lawsuits brought against
employers by current or former employees .... In response to this threat, and in an
attempt to avoid liability, employers have greatly restricted communications concerning
former and current employees.").
27. "Wood's Rule," as the doctrine originally was named in honor of its creator,
provided that the employer could dismiss an employee hired for an indefinite period of time
for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. See, e.g., Payne v. Western & At. R.R.,
81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W.
134 (Tenn. 1915). This rule and its virtual demise have been the subject of numerous
articles. See generally Sami M. Abbast et al., Employment at Will: An Eroding Concept in
Employment Relationships, 38 LAB. L.J. 21 (1987); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at
Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); David S. Hames, The Current Status of the Doctrine of
Employment-at-Will, 39 LAB. L.J. 19 (1988); Larry S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon
the Presumption That Employment Is Terminable at Will, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219 (1986);
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharge of Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHno ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Ellen Rust Peirce et al., Employee Termination at Will: A Principled
Approach, 28 ViLL. L.R. 1 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Bondi v. Jewels by Edward Ltd., 73 Cal. Rptr. 494, 496 (Cal. Ct. App.
1968).
29. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
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or violated the public interest.3"
Some commentators suggest that the increase in employee litigation -
and in defamation claims in particular31 - is attributable to the demise of the
employment at-will doctrine: "Egregious abuses of employees by employers,
once considered irremediable by courts that automatically invoked the
talismanic employment at-will doctrine, are increasingly being punished by
courts that are willing to replace stodgy precedent with searching inquiries
into the equities of the situation. 
32
B. The Narrowing of the Qualified Privilege
The courts have also shifted from the interests of employers toward the
rights of individuals by narrowing the common-law qualified privilege in
defamation actions. As one commentator noted, "[c]ourts ... have diluted
the protection [of the qualified privilege] by using low-threshold standards
to defeat [it] . . . and to shift the burden of defense to employers."' Fur-
ther, courts have withdrawn employer statements from the protection of
the qualified privilege although these statements historically were subject to
that protection. For example, the protection of the privilege formerly
extended to the right of an employer to discuss.with employees the miscon-
duct or reason for discharge of other employees.35 However, court decisions
30. See, e.g., Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (E.D. Mo.
1975), aft'd, 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d
174, 180 (Pa. 1974).
31. Such suits may be brought to remedy adverse personnel decisions, especially in
those states which have not adopted significant exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine
and which permit only a limited number of common-law actions directed at wrongful
discharge. See Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 800.
32. Prentice & Winslett, supra note 2, at 208.
33. See infra notes 52-151 and accompanying text (discussing defamation and its
application in employment context).
34. Posey, supra note 2, at 471; see Skopic, supra note 2, at 432; Tiefer, supra note
2, at 156; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985) (holding that Gertz rule, which restricts awards of presumed and punitive damages
to cases in which actual malice is proved, does not apply to defamatory statements that "do
not involve matters of public concern"); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334
S.E.2d 846, 850 (Va. 1985) ("[lWn light of the reduced constitutional value of speech
involving no matters of public concern . . . the state interest [in compensating a private
individual for injury to reputation] adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive
damages - even absent a showing of [New York Times] malice." (quoting Dun & Brad-
street, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761)).
35. See, e.g., Deaile v. General Tel. Co. of Cal., 115 Cal. Rptr. 582, 585 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1974); Louisiana Oil Co. v. Renno, 157 So. 705, 708 (Miss. 1934); Ramsdell v.
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in a number of states today demonstrate that such information is less often
considered to fall within the qualified privilege.36 In fact, one state court
has withdrawn the mantle of the qualified privilege entirely from employer
references that include allegations of criminal activity by.the employee. 37
C. Federal and State Legislation to Protect Employee Rights
In tandem with the judicial expansion of employee rights, legislatures
at both the federal and state level have increased employee rights signifi-
cantly over the last several decades: At the federal level, various anti-
discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,38
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 3 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990,10 have dramatically expanded employee rights.
Employees have used these statutes to challenge negative and defamatory job
references based on discriminatory views. For example, in Bilka v. Pepe's,
Inc. ,41 an employee successfully sued his employer for discrimination,
alleging that he received a negative reference in retaliation for bringing a
discrimination charge against the employer. 42
Enactment of the Fair Credit Reporting Act43 has opened up another
opportunity for employees to sue their employers for defamation. The Act
provides that in an investigation made by an outside agency the employee
must be notified of the investigation of both the employee's credit and the
Pennsylvania R. Co., 75 A. 444, 445 (N.J. 1910); Ponticelli v. Mine Safety Appliance Co.,
247 A.2d 303, 307 (R.I. 1968); Kroger Co. v. Young, 172 S.E.2d 720, 727. (Va. 1970);
see also Tiefer, supra note 2, at 156.
36. See, e.g., Thomas v. Howard, 168 A.2d 908, 910 (D.C. 1961); Drennan v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 328 So. 2d 52, 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Arison Shipping
Co. v. Smith, 311 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. App. 1975); Galvin v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford R.R., 168 N.E.2d 262, 266 (Mass. 1960); Sias v. General Motors Corp., 127
N.W.2d 357, 360 (Mich. 1964).
37. See Harrison v. Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 174 N.W.2d 875, 886-88 (Mich.
1969).
38. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1994).
39. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-624
(1994).
40. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
41. 601 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
42. Bilka v. Pepe's, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also Fergu-
son v. Mobil Oil Corp., 443 F. Supp. 1334, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mem., 607 F.2d
995 (2d Cir. 1979); Tarvesian v. Carr Div. of T.R.W., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.
Mass. 1976); Skopic, supra note 2, at 435 n.45.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994).
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employee's personal background, which may include job information.
Because the law provides employees with notice of adverse references, it
gives them access to the references used against them. Once apprised of a
negative reference, the employee may bring a defamation charge against a
former employer."
At the state level, "antiblacklisting" statutes' have been enacted to
prohibit employers from interfering with the right of employees to obtain
other employment. These laws significantly chill an employer's motivation
to provide references. An employer is subject to civil fines, and even
criminal fines in some states, for violations.4' Employer references have also
been determined to be subject to "service letter" laws, which require an
employer to give former employees a reason for their discharge.47 If an
employee objects to the contents of the service letter, the employee may
challenge it, thereby requiring the employer to prove the truth of the letter's
contents. Violations of these statutes give rise to fines and the possibility of
compensatory and punitive damages.48
Finally, more than two-thirds of the states have adopted some form of
privacy statute that can serve as the basis for employee suits.49 With such
a patchwork of common-law and legislative control over employee refer-
ences, one should not be surprised at employers' reluctance to respond when
queried about former employees.
D. The Diminished Presence of Labor Unions
In recent years, as unions have lost ground in providing redress of
workplace wrongs, individuals have taken on employers themselves, fortified
with legislative50 and common-law5' weapons that were nonexistent prior to
44. See, e.g., Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1080 (4th Cir. 1975)
(doctor sued consumer reporting agency for defamation for information published in report
that was furnished for employment purposes).
45. Antiblacklisting statutes historically have been used to prevent employers from
sharing lists of employees known to have engaged in union organizing efforts with other
employers. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 54 n.30 (listing states that have enacted anti-
blacklisting statutes).
46. Id. at 55.
47. See Skopic, supra note 2, at 43941 (discussing service letter statutes); see also
Saxton, supra note 2, at 57-58.
48. See Skopic, supra note 2, at 439-41 (discussing service letter statutes); see also
Saxton, supra note 2, at 57-58.
49. See Skopic, supra note 2, at 437 n.55.
50. Employment litigation previously often dealt with the .breach of certain workplace
statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1994); the Fair
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" the last few decades. This swing of the pendulum toward a broad recogni-
tion of individual employee rights in the workplace represents a 180-degree
shift from the relationship of the master and servant that dominated our
country prior to the Industrial Revolution.
11. Common-Law Causes of Action Against Improper
Employment References
In Part III, we examine the following array of torts to which an em-
ployer may be subject if the employer disseminates references to prospective
employers: defamation, tortious interference with employee economic gain,
intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. We also
examine the liability of the employer pursuant to the tort of negligent hiring
for failure to investigate employee backgrounds sufficiently.
A. Defamation Lawsuits Against Employers That Provide
Job References
The idea that a person can be injured by words which impugn that
individual's character or ability to work52 has been recognized since the
Middle Ages. 3 Originally, the ecclesiastical courts of England had exclu-
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994); the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1994); and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994). Legislative litigation in today's workplace more frequently deals
with discrimination against individual employees on the basis of sex, race, national origin,
religion, or color (Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-
17 (1994)); age (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994)); or disability (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1994)).
51. See infra notes 152-97 and accompanying text (discussing common-law causes of
action).
52. Because the law of defamation originally was not tailored with the workplace in
mind, several commentators have criticized the general common-law principles of defama-
tion as courts apply them to the employer/employee relationship. The authors of one article
lamented about common-law defamation principles:
Mhey do not function well in the employment setting for which they were never
intended. It is these long-standing principles that create inequities, spawn
expensive and lengthy litigation, and are ill-adapted to an environment in which
entities must communicate massive amounts of personnel information. Chilling
workplace communication stifles the free flow of evaluations, ratings, and
assessments and may ultimately harm the very interest the law of defamation
should protect.
See Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 809.
53. For a discussion of the history of defamation law, see generally HAROLD POTTER,
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sive jurisdiction over defamation cases,' and it was only in the mid-1500s
that common-law courts claimed jurisdiction over this cause of action.'5
Even then the cause of action was not available to everyone. In particular,
servants were not entitled to sue their masters for defamation.56 This was not
of much concern at the time, however, because the "contract" between the
master and servant was typically a lifetime contract of servitude and refer-
ences generally were not an important' issue.Y
When the common-law courts took jurisdiction of libel and slander
actions, they permitted recovery only in those cases in which the offensive
language impugned one's abilities in a trade, business, or profession.8 Un-
fortunately, this definition exempted common laborers who had no profes-
sional training in their jobs.59
As England shifted from an agrarian to an industrial economy during the
eighteenth century, treatises written at the time showed a change in the law
of defamation.60 This change, reflecting a new respect for laborers of all
AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 1958); BRUCE
W. SANDFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY §§ 2.1-.4 (2d ed. 1996); Frank Car, The English Law
of Defamation: With Especial Reference to the Distinction Between Libel and Slander (pts. 1
& 2), 18 LAW Q. REV. 255, 388 (1902); Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349
(1975); W.S. Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (pts. 1-3),
40 LAW Q. REV. 302, 397 (1924), 41 LAW Q. REV. 13 (1925); Colin Rhys Lovell, The
"Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1962); Jerome
Lawrence Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371 (1969); Van
Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (pts. 1 & 2), 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 546 (1903), 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904). Also, see Lewis et al., supra note 2, at
802 n.24 and Barry, supra note 2, at 267 n.14.
54. See R.H. Helmholz, Canonical Defamation in Medieval England, 15 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 255, 255 (1971); Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 802.
55. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 364 (2d ed. 1979);
Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 803.
56. See J.H. BAKER, supra note 55, at 190-98; Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 803.
57. See J.H. BAKER, supra note 55, at 190-98; Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 803.
58. See Veeder, supra note 53, at 558; Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 804.
59. A seventeenth-century case illustrates this exemption. In Bell v. Thatcher, 86 Eng.
Rep. 184 (K.B. 1669), a mail carrier sued his employer for defamation because the employer
had accused him of stealing. Although a lower court found for the plaintiff, the King's Bench
reversed, stating that "such an employment [is not such] that an action should lie for scandal-
izing.., the plaintiff... [who] seems to be little more than a common porter." ld.
60. See FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL 187 (1818). Holt states:
Every man has a right to the fruits of his industry, and, by a fair reputation and
character in his particular business, to the means of making his industry fruitful.
At common law therefore an action lies for words which slander a man in his
trade, or defame him in an honest calling.
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kinds, permitted them to sue for defamation regardless of their professional
standing. From case reports at both the federal61 and the state level,62 it is
evident that American courts adopted the English common-law defamation
principles as they applied to employees.
As originally set forth in the common law, defamation was a strict
liability offense, that is, liability arose upon proof of a statement's falsity
irrespective of the speaker's degree of care in uttering it, thus underscoring
the importance placed on a citizen's reputation.63 Although states had a
strong interest in protecting individual rights, including the right to protect
one's good name, states had an equally if not more compelling interest in the
free flow of information about employees' qualifications. To protect em-
ployees' interests, states provided various exceptions or "privileges," one of
which was the qualified privilege.' 4 Thus, historically, the common law
Id. at 217-18. Interestingly, Holt's treatise goes on to discuss an exception to the above
statement, which describes the employer's qualified privilege as we know it today:
An action will not lie by a servant against a former master, for a letter written by
him, in giving a character of the servant, unless the latter prove the malice, as well
as falsehood of the charge; even though the master makes specific charges of fraud.
So communications which respect a man's trade, when confidential, are not
actionable. Thus A. may lawfully state to B. in an unreserved manner, his opinion
of C's conduct and character provided it be done bonafide, whatever may be the
charges which are imputed to him.
Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted); see also Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 806-07; infra notes
126-51, 314-68, and accompanying text (discussing application of qualified privilege in
employment cases in United States).
61. See generally, e.g., White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How. 266) 439 (1845).
62. See generally, e.g., Ware v. Clowney, 24 Ala. 707 (1854); Obaugh v. Finn, 4 Ark.
110 (1842); Butler v. Howes, 7 Cal. 88 (1857); Howe Mach. Co. v. Souder, 58 Ga. 65
(1877); Hake v. Brames, 95 Ind. 161 (1883); McCauley v. Elrod, 27 S.W. 867 (Ky. Ct. App.
1894); Wiel v. Israel, 8 So. 826 (La. 1890); Fresh v. Cutter, 20 A. 774 (Md. 1890); Gassett
v. Gilbert, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 94 (1856); Rammell v. Otis, 60 Mo. 365 (1875); Brown v.
Orvis, 6 How. Pr. 376 (N.Y. 1851); Cole v. Neustadter, 29 P. 550 (Or. 1892); see also Lewis
et al., supra note 2, at 809 n.79.
63. As Prosser and Keeton notes, a defendant published at his own peril. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 804 (5th ed. 1984);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, topic 3, tit. A, note (1977) (Scope Note on
Conditional Privileges) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SCOPE NOTE]; Lewis et al., supra note 2,
at 816; Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 2, at 129; Daniloff, supra note 2, at 693; Horkan,
supra note 2, at 522. As noted earlier, however, the common law did acknowledge certain
defenses, one of which was the qualified privilege of an employer to discuss with a prospective
employer the qualifications of a former employee. Yet the employer lost the conditional
privilege if the employer abused it. See, e.g., Burton v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154,
154-56 (2d Cir. 1936); Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1825).
64. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 63, § 113, at 805.
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balanced employer and employee rights by holding that a party with a
conditional privilege fell outside the normal strict liability for a defamatory
communication.
Although the states applied strict liability to defamation for well over
one hundred years, the United States Supreme Court overruled this law in
the mid-1960s. Concerned that the strict liability standard did not suffi-
ciently protect the free flow of ideas, the Supreme Court, for the first time
in its history, reviewed a state libel action and concluded that important
constitutional principles applied in such a case.65 The Court's decision,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' began a process of expanding constitu-
tional rights in defamation that substantially affects the law today. As we
shall discuss, despite the possible benefits of less restrained discourse
prompted by these rulings, they injected an unwelcome note of complexity
and confusion in the law that creates significant disincentives for employers
to provide job references.67
B. The Elements of Defamation
As it exists today, defamation provides liability for the publication of
injurious falsehoods about individuals based on negligence or some greater
65. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 n.3 (1964) "(noting that
Court was considering issue for first time); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author
Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983).
66. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The case involved a police commissioner who had won the
largest libel award ever granted in the state of Alabama by successfully claiming that he had
been libeled by the publication in The New York Times of an advertisement that requested
contributions for a civil rights group. Professor Smolla aptly describes the political climate
in which the decision took place:
The New York Times decision to some degree embodied .legal and cultural
inclinations that were waiting to be crystallized into more sharply contoured
doctrine. The case came before the Court at a time in American history that
could not help but influence all legal thought related to free expression. It is no
accident that the New York Tunes decision came just as the cultural turbulence of
the 1960's was about to be unleashed in full force. The struggle for genuine
equality for blacks that followed Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), was intimately bound up with the protection of defiant and rebellious
speech. Many of the most important legal decisions that helped give impetus to
the civil rights movement were not equal protection cases, but rather First
Amendment cases protecting strategies of mass protest.
See Smolla, supra note 65, at 8 n.51.
67. In fact, most constitutional privileges may not apply to employment-reference cases
involving only private parties, but the legal confusion about whether they apply causes
considerable difficulty. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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degree of fault. The Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies the elements
of a cause of action for defamation as follows:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher;
and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of social harm or
the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 68
In the employment context, an employer defames an employee if the
employer publishes a false statement concerning the employee that is
without privilege and that injures the employee's reputation. For example,
former employees have sued their employers for defamation based on
allegedly false accusations of sexual harassment,69 for publication of a
termination letter that contained allegedly false and defamatory remarks," °
for statements by the former employer's agents that the employee was "a
zero, "71 and for the statement that the employee was fired "for cause.
1. The Defamatory Statement
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a statement is defama-
tory if it "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him."' Statements in a reference that adversely and falsely
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
69. See Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995).
70. See Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1375 (D. Mass.
1980).
71. See Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex. App. 1984).
72. See Carney v. Memorial Hosp. & Nursing Home, 475 N.E.2d 451, 453 (N.Y.
1985).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). The Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue of whether the Constitution requires that the plaintiff bear the burden of
proving the statement is false or whether the defendant bears the burden of proving the
statement is true. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 5.05-5.07 (1986); see
also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-
34 n.16 (1979). The Supreme Court, however, has held that the First Amendment requires
that the plaintiff prove that the statement was false if the statement was made by a media
defendant involving a matter of public concern. See Milkovich, 470 U.S. at 19-20. Some
states have held, at least in dicta, that a private figure plaintiff has the. burden of proving
the falsity of a defamatory statement made by a nonmedia, as well as a media, defendant.
See, e.g., Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1022-23 n.23 (D.C. 1990).
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reflect on an employee's abilities are defamatory, and the courts have so
held in numerous cases, whether the defamatory statement was oral or
written. 74
A statement can be either fact or opinion.75 Employers historically
have been permitted to voice personal opinions concerning former employ-
ees without being subject to liability for defamation.76 At one point, the
Supreme Court seemed to endorse this distinction strongly. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. ,' the Court stated:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other
ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.78
Although a majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals interpreted
this language to mean that statements of fact are actionable while statements
of opinion are not,79 a 1990 Supreme Court decision, Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co.,"' has cast doubt on this proposition. In Milkovich, the Court
declared that freedom of expression "is adequately secured by existing
constitutional doctrine without creation of an artificial dichotomy between
'opinion' and fact."" A number of courts have interpreted Milkovich to
74. See, e.g., Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 84-86 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that letter
of reference written by Ross to prospective employer defamed plaintiff-employee); Frank
B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 617-21 (Tex. App. 1984) (finding that oral
statements made by employer's agents to third party defamed employee). Libel refers to
defamation by printed or written words while slander refers to defamation by oral words.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 111, at 771. Although libel originally was treated more
seriously under common law than slander, the distinction today is limited. See SMOLLA,
supra note 73, at § 1.04[3]; Barry, supra note 2, at 269-70.
75. As a rough rule of thumb, facts assert matters that are empirically verifiable.
Opinions express the speaker's attitude or feelings on a subject.
76. See, e.g., Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 634 F. Supp. 950, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Burns v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 154, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D. Md. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 830 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 810 n.87.
77. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
78. Gertz v. Robert Weldh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
79. See, e.g., Potomac Valve & Fitting Inc. v. 'Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280,
1286 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[t]he constitutional distinction between fact and opinion
is now firmly established in the case law of the circuits"); OIlman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,
974-75 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (listing federal circuit court decisions that adopted fact/opinion
dichotomy).
80. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
81. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990). The Court implied that
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mean that any statement - even one expressed as an opinion - can serve
as the basis for a cause of action for defamation if the statement reasonably
implies a false assertion of fact.'
The Court's blurring of the distinction between opinion and fact could
increase employer liability for defamation. Case law in some jurisdictions
indicates that this has occurred in situations when employers' expressions
of opinion clearly rest on verifiable underlying facts. For example, in
Davis v. Ross,' singer Diana Ross, in an unsolicited manner, mailed letters
concerning a former employee to a number of colleagues stating that Ross
was unable to recommend the employee because of her "personal habits."
Although the reference contained no specific defamatory facts, in the
court's eyes, it did imply that there were statements of fact behind this
opinion which were defamatory. 4 The blurring of the fact/opinion distinc-
tion adds further to employers' uncertainty in giving job references.'
the lower courts misinterpreted Gertz:
Read in context .... the fair meaning of the passage is to equate the word
"opinion" in the second sentence with the word "idea" in the first sentence.
Under this view, the language was merely a reiteration of Justice Holmes' classic
"marketplace of ideas" concept. Thus we do not think that this passage from
Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that
might be labeled "opinion." Not only would such an interpretation be contrary
to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would also ignore the fact that
expressions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of objective fact.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
82. See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1995); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 1990); Criticare Sys.,
Inc. v. Nellcor Inc., 856 F. Supp. 495, 507 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Woodmont Corp. v.
Rockwood Ctr. Partnership, 811 F. Supp. 1478, 1482-83 (D. Kan. 1993); Scheidler v.
National Org. for Women, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 743, 745 (N.D. El. 1990); Sigal Constr.
Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1209-10 (D.C. 1991).
83. 754 F.2d 80, 83-86 (2d Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 86; see also Holdaway Drugs, Inc. v. Braden, 582 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Ky.
1979) (finding opinion expressed by employer that former employee left under suspicion of
drug use actionable as defamation if made with malice). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
also provides a cause of action for defamation based on opinion if it can be proved that the
opinion was based on undisclosed defamatory facts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 566 (1977). But see Rosenberg v. American Bowling Congress, 589 F. Supp. 547, 551
(M.D. Fla. 1984) (finding that conclusions of investigatory committee are not actionable
unless identified as assertion of fact); Williams v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 339 S.W.2d
792, 797-98 (Mo. 1960) (finding that statement by employer that internal investigation
"appeared to give reasonable grounds for believing" that employee was guilty of theft is not
factual assertion giving rise to cause of action for defamation); see also Horkan, supra note
2, at 521 n.24.
85. See infra notes 346-52 and accompanying text.
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2. Publication
The second requirement for a cause of action for defamation is publica-
tion of an unprivileged nature to a third party. Publication of the defama-
tory matter is essential to liability86 because defamation is a tort that pri-
marily protects a person's interest in his or her reputation.' No loss of
reputation can occur if a false statement is uttered solely to the person
whom it concerns because such a communication cannot damage the
person's reputation in the eyes of the community. 8
Plaintiffs in general and employees in particular have been given a
boost in pursuing defamation cases by a new twist in the judicial interpreta-
tion of the publication requirement. At least ten states have recognized a
"self-publication" doctrine, first applied to employment-reference cases in
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,89 which held that employees
compelled by prospective employers to repeat defamatory statements by
their former employers in job interviews may seek damages from their
former employers.'
In the Lewis case, an employer who terminated several employees for
"gross insubordination" for refusing to falsify expense account records,
declined to explain the grounds for firing them when queried by prospective
employers. The employer's silence compelled the employees to explain the
reasons for their termination to prospective employers in order to be
considered for jobs. Under these facts, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that the employer should have foreseen this result and would be liable
for placing the employees in such a Catch-22 situation.9"
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. a (1977).
87. Id. cmt. b.
88. See, e.g., Campbell v. Willmark Serv. Sys., Inc., 123 F.2d 204, 206 (3d Cir.
1941); Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (D. Mass.), aff'd
636 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1980); Udell v. Josephson, 11 N.Y.S.2d 866, 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1939); Young v. First State Bank, Watonga, 628 P.2d 707, 713 (Okla. 1981); Rivers v.
Feazell, 58 S.W.2d 133, 134 (rex. Civ. App. 1933); see also Prentice & Winslett, supra
note 2, at 211 n.27.
89. 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
90. See Kristensen, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that California, Colorado, Georgia,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas have adopted self-publication
doctrine). Examples of cases holding that employees can sue when forced to "self-publish"
defamatory material are McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980), Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 38 S.E.2d 306 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946), Grist v.
Upjohn Co., 168 N.W.2d 389 (Mich Ct. App. 1969), Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696
S.W.2d 439 (rex. App. 1985), and First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980). But see infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
91. 361 N.W.2d at 881 (reasoning that liability should attach "[w]hen an injured party
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Although some jurisdictions have adopted the self-publication doctrine,
the majority of states do not support this approach, and a number of states
have rejected it.' Nonetheless, where the doctrine has been adopted,
employers face yet another source of potential liability.
Aside from self-publication cases, publication rarely emerges as central
to most employment-reference cases. As one commentator noted, the issue
of publication is not typically disputed in situations involving employment
references; rather, the employer disputes the nature of the publication,
claiming that it was privileged. 3 Thus, the dispute in employee defamation
cases typically centers on the issue of abuse of the qualified privilege rather
than on the issue of publication.
3. The Fault Requirement
For many years, courts imposed liability for defamation without a
requirement of fault on the part of the defendant. However, since the case
of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. - which arguably abolished the common-
law rule of strict liability even in cases of private plaintiffs' suing nonmedia
defendants' - most courts have required a showing of negligence.95 Thus,
an employer generally will be held liable for the publication of a defama-
operates under a strong compulsion to republish, and that compelled repetition is reasonably
foreseeable").
92. See, e.g., Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995)
(rejecting self-publication doctrine because vast majority of states do not recognize it); De
Leon v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 871 F.2d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to recognize
claim for compelled self-publication because it has not "gained widespread acceptance");
Yeitrakis v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 93-2187, 1995 WL 151799, at *3-*4 (10th
Cir. Apr. 6, 1995) (unpublished) (rejecting self-publication theory in part on basis
that only minority of jurisdictions have recognized it); Churchey v. Adolph Coors, Co.,
725 P.2d 38, 41 (Colo. App. 1986) ("We perceive no sound reason for weakening the
general rule by carving out an exception based on foreseeability in employment termina-
tion cases.").
93. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 70.
94. Although Prosser and Keeton states that the Gertz standard should not necessarily
be interpreted to extend to communications between private individuals concerning private
matters, they note that "the American Law Institute has predicted that state law will require
as a prerequisite to recovery in any case of defamation a showing of at least negligence with
respect to truth or falsity and that such should be the law." KEETON ET AL., supra note 63,
§ 113, at 808; see also Daniloff, supra note 2, at 699 n.61.
95. See Daniloff, supra note 2, at 698 n.60 (listing states adopting some form of
negligence standard for defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs). A number of
noted legal authorities have interpreted Gertz to require a negligence standard in these cases.
See KEaroN Er AL., supra note 63, § 113, at 807-08; SMOLLA, supra note 73, at § 3.01(3).
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tory statement concerning an employee only if the employer was negligent
in allowing that statement to be made.
96
4. The Harm Requirement
The final element of a cause of action for defamation is that the
plaintiff's reputation be harmed.' Such harm may arise in one of two
ways. The harm may be general in nature, that is, injuring the plaintiff's
reputation overall by maligning the plaintiffs professional abilities. 98 To
establish a cause of action for defamation of a general nature, the plaintiff
need not prove damages, but simply must show that the statement was made
and that it was untrue. The second type of injury is that of "special
harm. "99 Special harm requires proof of damages with specificity; damages
are not presumed. In the employment context, special harm may be dem-
onstrated by showing that the employee failed to obtain employment at a
particular organization due to the defamatory statement.
C. Employer Defenses to Defamation Actions
Defamation appears- to be among the most frequently invoked lawsuits
brought by employees to remedy work-related wrongs ranging from dis-
charge to poor performance evaluations. This is so despite the many
96. An employer can also be found liable for fault greater than negligence if the
employer knowingly'publishes a false statement or does so in reckless disregard of the truth.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977); Paezold & Willborn, supra note 2,
at 129-30 n.27.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
98. This is libel or slander "per se." See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 112, at
788 (noting that for certain categories of defamation, such as those that address "the
imputation of a crime, of a loathsome disease, and those affecting the plaintiff in his
business, trade, profession, office or calling," no proof of damages is required); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (1977) ("One who publishes a slander that ascribes
to another conduct, characteristics or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for
the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade, or profession . . . is subject to liability
without proof of special harm."); Haas v. Evening Democrat Co., 107 N.W.2d 444, 447
(Iowa 1961); Mayo v. Goldman, 122 S.W. 449, 450 (rex. Civ. App. 1909); Wilson v. Sun
Pub. Co., 148 P. 774, 778 (Wash. 1915); Saxton, supra note 2, at 71 n.93.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 557, 575 (1977). The Restatement defines
"special harm" .as "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value .... Special
harm may be a loss of presently existing advantage, as a discharge from employment. It
may also be a failure to realize a reasonable expectation of gain, as the denial of employ-
ment, which but for the currency of the slander, the plaintiff would have received." Id.
cmt. b, at 198.
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substantial defenses available to employers to challenge such lawsuits. 11°
In this section, we discuss the various defenses available to employers in
employment-reference cases.
1. Truth
Truth is generally an absolute defense to a cause of action for defama-
tion. 1' In cases in which the employer proves that its statements are true,
courts have found for the employer regardless of the impact on the em-
ployee's reputation or ability to procure other employment. 0 Commenta-
tors have pointed to several fallacies surrounding this defense that make it
less useful than it might appear. First, the facts surrounding the basis of
the defamatory statement - whether a dismissal or resignation - are rarely
free of dispute.0 3 If the facts are debatable in the least, the employee may
allege defamation, and "[e]ven if the employer is correct and the statements
made in the job reference are true, juries tend to be more. sympathetic
toward the plaintiff ('the little guy') and not the employer." 14
Second, judicial interpretation has diminished the effect of this defense.
For example, in a Wisconsin Court of Appeals decision, Zinda v.
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 05 an employer defended a claim for defamation
on the basis of truth - written documentation that the employee falsified
employment forms. However, the court found that the employer's applica-
tion forms were ambiguous and should therefore be construed against the
drafter. Despite the clear impropriety of the employee's actions, the
employer was unable to use the documents to prove that the employee did,
in fact, falsify the forms. This case raises the concern that, even when an
employer has tried to document the explanation for termination of an
employee, courts will give the employee every benefit of the doubt in an
action based on defamation.
100. See infra note 320 and atcompanying text (discussing low probability of success
in defamation lawsuits).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977).
102. See, e.g., Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57-58 (Utah 1991) (finding
that employer was not liable for defamation because employer's comments concerning
former employees' use of drugs while on company business were true and, therefore,
privileged).
103. See Acoff, supra note 2, at 760; Jeff B. Copeland, The Revenge of the Fired,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 46.
104. Acoff, supra note 2, at 760-61.
105. 409 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); see also Barry, supra note 2, at 290.
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2. Consent
The other absolute defense to defamation is an employee's consent to
publication of an employer's statements concerning the employee. 6
Typically, this defense applies when an employer requests that the employee
execute a waiver of liability or give written consent before the employer
will provide a reference for the employee.17 However, a number of courts
have eroded this defense by holding that neither consent nor release bars an
action for defamation because a party should not be permitted to absolve
itself from an intentional tort such as defamation. 
108
3. Absolute Privilege
The common law has long recognized an "absolute privilege" with
respect to certain statements under particular circumstances. Such state-
ments, even when uttered maliciously and falsely, cannot give rise to a
cause of action for defamation. 1"
The policy underlying absolute privilege rests on the assumption that
the public interest in having people speak on certain topics or in certain
situations outweighs the harm that their potentially false and malicious
statements will cause. Absolute Privilege attaches to three categories of
speech: (1) judicial and administrative hearings, (2) legislative proceedings,
and (3) executive communications of state and federal officers concerning
public affairs." 0 The absolute privilege also applies to statements between
husband and wife, and statements required to be published by law."'
Within the employment context, employers enjoy an absolute privilege in
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977) (stating that "the consent of
another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his
action for defamation"); see also Lewis et al., supra note 2, at 822.
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433. 436-37 (Tex. App. 1992) (finding
that employee's execution of consent exculpated employer from liability concerning state-
ments that employer made in reference even if statements were defamatory); see also Acoff,
supra note 2, at 759.
108. See, e.g., Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817-18 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); see also Acoff, supra note 2, at 759. For a discussion of our views on the
propriety of permitting employers to require employees to sign liability waivers with respect
to job references, see infra notes 369-78 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Drummond v. Stahl, 618 P.2d 616, 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); KEETON
ET AL., supra note 63, § 114, at 816-20.
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 114, at 816-23; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 585-591 (1977).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 592-592A (1977).
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making statements before quasi-judicial boards such as those addressing
unemployment, workers' compensation, and grievance disputes.
12
4. Constitutional Privilege
Beginning with the case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"' in 1964,
the Supreme Court has spelled out a number of constitutional principles that
now govern state tort law in certain circumstances. Taken collectively,
these cases establish a "constitutional privilege" that applies to tort cases.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court created a new standard - that
of "actual malice" on the part of the publisher - which must be met by a
public official before he or she can succeed in a defamation case. Specifi-
cally, the Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with "actual malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'
Several years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,"5 the Supreme Court
further expanded free speech protections by extending the class of defen-
dants protected by the actual malice standard to include "public figures."
In a subsequent decision, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,"6 the Court
again tinkered with defamation standards of proof by ruling that the New
York Times protections should extend to defamatory falsehoods relating to
private persons if the statements concerned matters of "public interest" or
"public concern."
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court addressed the
standard to be applied in private figure libel cases. Gertz has had the most
112. Id. § 585 cmt. b.
113. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
114. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
115. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
116. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
117. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The facts of Gertz involved the defaming of an attorney by
a right-wing news publication which called him a "Communist-front," a "Leninist," and a
"Marxist," none of which was true. Id. at 325-26. Elmer Gertz had incurred the wrath of
the paper by being hired to pursue a civil action against a police officer, Richard Nuccio,
who had shot and killed one Ronald Nelson. Id. Although Nuccio was in fact convicted
of murdering Nelson, Gertz played no part in either the civil or criminal cases against
Nuccio, and made no public statements or appearances in connection with the case. Id.
The trial court ultimately found against Gertz on the theory that the statements made in the
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impact on defamation law as it applies to employers and employees, and has
set the stage for the interpretation of current defamation laws. In Gertz, the
Court clarified the standard of proof necessary for private citizens suing for
defamation. The Court indicated that the states could devise standards of
liability in defamation cases only "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault." '1 This constitutes a far lower standard than the one set
forth in New York Times. As the Gertz Court noted:
The "public of general interest" test for determining the applicability of
the New York Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately
serves both of the competing values at stake. On the one hand, a private
individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does
concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he
can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times. This is true
despite the factors that distinguish the state interest in compensating
private individuals from the analogous interest involved in the context of
public persons. On the other hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a
defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it took every
reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions. 119
Finally, the Gertz Court imposed constraints on the states' ability to
award punitive damages in defamation cases, stating that punitive damages
would not be awarded without proof of actual malice in all cases and that
an award of general damages would not be granted without a showing of
"actual injury."
1 2
The last case in the quartet of Supreme Court cases revising common-
law defamation is Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc."'
This case addressed the issue of whether a private citizen suing a nonmedia
defendant must meet the New York Times standard of actual malice to obtain
punitive damages. The Court held that the Gertz rule did not apply to
nonmedia defendants such as a credit agency and that the actual malice
standard attached only to publications of public or general interest."
publication were a matter of public interest and that Gertz had not proved actual malice.
Id. at 329. The circuit court affirmed, applying Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29 (1971). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S 323, 327-32 (1974); see also Smolla, supra note 65, at 9-10 n.59.
118. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
119. Id. at 346.
120. Id. at 349-50.
121. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
122. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-63
(1985).
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Noting that "it is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart
of the First Amendment's protection,"'"z the Court pointed out that "[i n
contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First
Amendment concern. "124
Employers that look to the scope of constitutional privilege to deter-
mine whether such a privilege provides protection to those that give em-
ployment references are likely to be disappointed. In fact, a careful reading
of the cases involving constitutional privilege reveals that few if any consti-




The qualified privilege is designed to encourage free and open com-
munication between individuals with a common interest in a subject. Em-
ployers that provide job references to prospective employers generally
qualify for qualified privilege protection. As one court stated, "[w]ithout
the protection of the privilege, employers might be reluctant to give sincere
yet critical responses to requests for an appraisal of a prospective em-
ployee's qualifications."'" The qualified privilege even permits an em-
ployer to publish false and defamatory statements about an employee127 if
123. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
124. Id. at 759.
125. See infra note 392 and accompanying text (summarizing constitutional privilege
protections). Having noted the inapplicability of the constitutional privilege to the typical
employment-reference case, we nonetheless recommend the adoption through statute of some
of the rules of constitutional privilege. See infra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
126. Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991); see also Alford v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 331 So. 2d 558, 562 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(stating that refusal to recognize privilege "would either tend to stifle communication of
qualification and character evaluations, inherently subjective in nature, or alternatively,
would breed deception in its wake"); Marchesi v. Franchino, 387 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Md.
1978) ("The common law conditional privileges rest upon the notion that a defendant may
escape liability for an otherwise actionable defamatory statement, if publication of the
utterance advances social policies of greater importance than the vindication of a plaintiff's
reputational interest."); Swanson v. Spiedel, 293 A.2d 307, 310 (R.I. 1972) ("[G]iving such
information in good faith to other employers protects the publisher's own interests by
insuring that he may seek and receive the same information when about to hire new
employees.").
127. See, e.g., Arsenault v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1373, 1380 (D.
Mass. 1980) ("Where a defendant relies on a conditional privilege, the truth or falsehood
of the allegedly defanatory remark is not material."); Doane v. Grew, 107 N.E. 620, 621-
22 (Mass. 1915) (stating that, in absence of proof of malice, recklessness, or ill will,
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the communication was made under the proper circumstances to an appro-
priate person.
In deciding whether an employer's statements qualify for a qualified
privilege, the courts must determine that the employer made the statements
on a "privileged occasion" and that the employer did not abuse the privi-
lege. Section 595 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth the
circumstances under which a publication is conditionally privileged:
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important inter-
est of the recipient or a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal
duty to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its
publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of
decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted
standards of decent conduct it is an important factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request rather than
volunteered by the publisher 128 or
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties. 29
Section 595 applies to communications about the character or conduct
of an employee by a former employer to a prospective employer under the
following circumstances:
The defamatory imputations . . . must be made for the purpose of en-
abling that person to protect his own interests, and they must be reason-
ably calculated to do so. Accordingly, only information that is likely to
affect the honesty and efficiency of the servant's work comes within the
privilege .... Imputations that have no connection with the work that
the servant is to perform, or with the position that he will occupy in the
[prospective employer's] employment, are outside the scope of the privi-
lege. 130
Most states follow the Restatement's approach and recognize the giving
of employee references in response to inquiries from prospective employers
defense of privilege will prevail even if remark was, in fact, false).
128. For example, the court refused qualified privilege protection to unsolicited
derogatory statements made by Diana Ross concerning a former employee. See Davis v.
Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1985).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1977).
130. Id. § 595 cmt. i (1977).
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as a privileged occasion,' as long as the former employer is able to prove
that: (1) the statements were made in good faith; (2) the former employer
had an interest to be upheld; (3) the statements were limited in scope to the
necessary purpose; (4) they were made on a proper occasion; and (5) publi-
cation was made in a proper manner and only to proper parties. 32
If an employer-defendant can demonstrate that the statement is eligible
for a qualified privilege, the employer will prevail in a defamation action
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer abused the privi-
lege. 3 1 The privilege is subject to abuse in a variety of ways. The Restate-
ment provides that the following acts will generally result in forfeiture of
the privilege:"
(1) publishing information that the publisher knows to be false, or acting
in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity; 3
131. See, e.g., Kenney v. Gilmore, 393 S.E.2d 472, 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) ("A
prima facie privilege shields statements made concerning a current or former employee by
a current or former employer to one, such as a prospective employer, who has a legitimate
interest in such information."); Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 612,
615 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that "[als a general rule an employee reference given by
a former employer to a prospective employer is clothed with the mantle of a qualified
privilege"); Alford v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 331 So. 2d 558, 561-62 (La. Ct. App. 1976)
(recognizing qualified privilege for communications between former and prospective
employers when statements are made in good faith and for legitimate purpose); Erickson v.
Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 805 (N.J. 1990) (applying qualified privilege to
employer's communications in response to unsolicited inquiries from prospective employers
of discharged employee); Swanson v. Speidel Corp., 293 A.2d 307, 309-10 (R.I. 1972)
(recognizing qualified privilege in communications between former and prospective employ-
ers); see also Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 697-98 (Md. 1976); Wynn v.
Cole, 243 N.W.2d 923, 927 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Cash v. Empire Gas Corp., 547
S.W.2d 830, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Rogozinski v. Airstream By Angell, 377 A.2d 807,
818 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 563 P.2d
1205, 1210 (Or. 1977); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (Wis. 1975);
Hett v. Ploetz, 121 N.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Wis. 1963); KEETON ET AL., supra note 63,
§ 115, at 828-31.
132. Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1399, 1427 (N.D. Iowa 1995); see
also Knudsen v. Chicago & N.W. Trans. Co., 464 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1990); Brown
v. First Nat'l Bank of Mason City, 193 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Iowa 1972).
133. See Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 657 P.2d 101, 105 (Nev. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 619 (1977).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600, 603-605A (1977).
135. The prevailing rule among the states appears to be that employers do not lose the
privilege by mere negligence in publishing statements about former employees. See Donald
Paul Duffala, Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer's Qualified Privilege to Publish
Employees' Work Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R. 4th 144, 150 (1983); see also Boston
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Varone, 303 F.2d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 1962); Jacron Sales Co. v.
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(2) publishing the defamatory matter for a purpose other than that for
which the privilege was intended;
(3) publishing the information to parties outside the scope of the intended
privilege;
(4) publishing defamatory matter which the publisher does not reasonably
believe is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the privilege
was granted;
(5) publishing unprivileged matter along with the privileged matter. 136
The privilege may be lost not only if the employer abuses it, but also
if the employer acts with malice. Unfortunately, the states do not offer a
consistent definition of the term "malice.t" Although the malice standard is
the one most often used to prove breach of the qualified privilege, 137 courts
remain split on the definition of the term. 38  Some courts 139 use the
common-law definition of malice -that examines the intent of the pub-
Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 699 (Md. 1976); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d
510, 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). The first Restatement of Torts adopted a lesser standard,
that of liability if the employer lacks belief or reasonable grounds for belief in the defama-
tory matter. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 600-601 (1938). The Restatement (Second) of
Torts adopts a higher standard in response to the Gertz decision. Explanation for the
standard is set forth as follows:
The traditional common law system of a set of conditional privileges with
possible loss of the privilege through its abuse.., involves a process of balanc-
ing competing interests in accordance with the facts. The traditional balance at
common law had been attained in the past by holding that a person having a
conditional privilege was not subject to the normal strict liability for a defama-
tory communication but was liable only if he did not believe the statement to be
true or lacked reasonable grounds for so believing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 cmt. a (1977). This adjustment of the conflicting
interests has now been subjected to necessary modification by the holding of the Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), that strict liability in defamation
is unconstitutional and that a publisher can be held liable only if the publisher was at least
negligent regarding the falsity of the statement.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600, 603-605A (1977).
137. Duffala, supra note 135, at 150.
138. A number of authorities have bemoaned the concept of malice in defamation cases.
Most notably, Dean Prosser wrote that "[tihe word 'malice'. . . has plagued the law of def-
arnation from the beginning." KEETONET AL., supra note 63, § 115, at 833; see also LAW-
RENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 93, at 509 (1978); Saxton, supra note
2, at 73; Daniloff, supra note 2, at 710 n.130; infra notes 339-43 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1980).
The court took pains to explain why it chose to adopt the common-law definition of "malice"
over the New York Times definition, stating that the former focuses on the defendant's
attitude toward the truth of what he has said rather than on his attitude toward the plaintiff.
Id. at 258; see also Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 691 (Md. 1976); Calero v.
Del Chem. Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737, 744-48 (Wis. 1975).
1410
"NO COMMENT" POLICIES: A REFORM PROPOSAL
lisher including "ill will, bad or evil motive, or such gross indifference or
reckless disregard of the rights of others as to amount to a willful or
wanton act. " "4° Other courts equate common-law malice with "bad faith,"141
still others with "disinterested malevolence,"142 "ill will," 43 or a "wrongful
act done intentionally without just cause or excuse."' 44 Indeed, one court,
seemingly in fear of leaving any definition out, defined malice as
some sinister or corrupt motive such as hatred, revenge, personal spite,
ill will, or desire to injure the plaintiff; or what, as a matter of law, is
equivalent to malice, that the communication was made with such gross
indifference and recklessness as to amount to a wanton or willful disre-
gard of the rights of the plaintiff. 45
A small number of courts apply the actual malice standard set forth by
the Supreme Court in New York Times.'" This standard, a higher standard
than that found in the common law," requires that the publisher have
known that the defamatory statement was false or have acted in reckless
disregard of whether the statement was false. 14  Although a majority of
140. Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App. 1984);
see Daniloff, supra note 2, at 711 n.134 (listing cases using common-law definition of
malice with multitude of interpretations on theme); see also Duffala, supra note 135, at 186-
89.
141. Goforth v. Avemco Life Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 25, 31 (5th Cir. 1966); Sigal Constr.
Corp. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1214 (D.C. 1991) ("In this jurisdiction, we have equated
common law malice with 'bad faith.'").
142. Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 188 F. Supp. 565, 569 (D. Mass.
1960).
143. Manguso v. Oceanside Unified Sch. Dist., 200 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
144. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1275 (3d Cir. 1974).
145. Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846, 851 n.3 (Va. 1985)
(quoting Preston v. Land, 255 S.E.2d 509, 511 (Va. 1979)).
146. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
147. As one court recently noted, "only clear and convincing proof will support
recovery." Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1995) (choos-
ing to adopt "actual malice" standard for employer-employee defamation action). Further-
more, mere negligence is clearly insufficient to overcome the privilege. Id.
148. See id. The Supreme Court of Texas defined actual malice in the following terms:
Actual malice is not ill will; it is the making of a statement with knowledge that
it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is true. "Reckless disregard"
is defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of which
the plaintiff must present "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."
An error in judgment is not enough.
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courts have rejected the New York Times standard for private defamation
cases, 149 a handful of courts have chosen to adopt it. 50
There is, therefore, a confusing patchwork of conflicting standards that
are applied to defamation claims, and the employer is caught in the middle.
With such a confused interpretation of abuse of the privilege and application
of the term "malice," the employer is uncertain which standards will be
applied when that employer gives a reference. The fact that so many
diverse standards apply is reason enough to keep one's mouth shut. 51
IV. Other Common-Law Sources of Employer Liability
for Job References
In Part IV, we discuss several other tort theories that could influence
an employer's decision whether to give references on former or current
employees. Although these approaches tend to be invoked less often than
defamation, they nonetheless represent sources of concern for employers
that give references.
A. Interference with Economic Advantage
The first theory, intentional interference with prospective economic
advantage, 52 is often brought with a claim for defamation. That is, the
employee alleges that the employer that gave a false and defamatory job
reference interfered with the employee's opportunity for other employment.
Most plaintiffs that sue for defamation include a claim for intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage to buttress their allega-
tions that the employer acted intentionally and to emphasize the economic
damage created by the employer's falsehood. This theory rarely serves as
149. See Duffala, supra note 135, at 150.
150. See, e.g., Duffy, 44 F.3d at 313; Knudsen v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 464
N.W.2d 439, 443 (Iowa 1990); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 695 (Md. 1976).
Some courts have adopted the actual malice standard in order for a private figure to recover
punitive damages. See In re IBP Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 647 (8th
Cir. 1986).
151. Even this tactic may not be foolproof because of the self-publication doctrine. See
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 361 N.W.2d 875, 880-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see
also supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing Lewis).
152. See, e.g., Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 170-71 (7th Cir.
1993); Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Ark. 1982);
Marshall v. Brown, 190 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Willner v. Silverman, 71
A. 962, 964 (Md. 1909); Owens v. Williams, 77 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Mass. 1948); Stelzer
v. Carmelite Sisters, 619 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Musso v. Miller, 38
N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942); Geyer v. Steinbronn, 506 A.2d 901, 909-10 (Pa.
Super. 1986).
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the basis for an independent cause of action. 5 1
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospec-
tive contractual relation ... is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation,
whether the interference consists of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or
continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective
relation. 154
The employee bears the burden of proving that the employer intention-
ally interfered with the employee's job prospect.15 Further, the employ-
ment prospect must be one that was clearly within the grasp of the em-
ployee absent the negative reference given by the former employer. A
mere expectancy of employment is not sufficient to meet the requirements
of this cause of action.
15 6
Since the early origins of this tort, there has been general acceptance
of the principle that a purely malicious motive, such as spite or a desire to
do harm by an employer to an employee, is sufficient but not necessary to
find that the employer intentionally and improperly interfered with the
plaintiff's prospective employment." An employee may prevail in this
cause of action simply by showing that a former employer improperly
intended to interfere with the employee's future employment. 158 However,
some courts have held that the plaintiff must show malice in those cases in
which the employer's statements are privileged.1
59
153. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 129, at 992; see also, e.g., Scholtes v.
Signal DeliVery Sew., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 490 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (considering case in
which employee brought suit for both contractual interference and defamation). On
occasion, employees have used this tort independently. See, e.g., Delloma v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering suit against former employer
alleging contractual interference based on employer's false reference).
154. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 766B (1977); see also KEETON ET AL., supra
note 63, § 129, at 978-84; Saxton, supra note 2, at 65.
155. Skopic, supra note 2, at-443-44.
156. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 130, at 1010 n.49. But see id. at 1006
(noting that expectancies for "future contractual relations" have been protected).
157. See, e.g., Wheeler-Stenzel Co. v. American Window Glass Co., 89 N.E. 28, 29
(Mass. 1909); Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 205 N.W. 630, 631 (Minn. 1925);
Jones v. Leslie, 112 P. 81, 83-84 (Wash. 1910).
158. See Skopic, supra note 2, at 444.
159. See, e.g., Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co., 996 F.2d 168, 171 (7th Cir. 1993).
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An employer that provides an honest reference on a former employee
is not likely to be liable for contractual interference unless the employer
acts with evil motive or wrongful intent to prevent contractual relations.I°
The employer is in all likelihood protected by a privilege similar to the
qualified privilege in defamation cases. 6  Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts describes the qualified privilege in intentional interference with
prospective contractual advantage as follows: "[A]ny purpose sufficient to
create a privilege to disturb existing contractual relations, such as the
disinterested protection of the interests of third persons, or tiose of the
public, or of the defendant's own property or business interests .... will
also justify interference with relations which are merely prospective."162
The qualified privilege was raised to defeat an employee's claim for
contractual interference in Delloma v. Consolidation Coal Co. 63 In
Delloma, the employer, responding to a request for information from a
prospective employer, disclosed that the plaintiff had been discharged for
sexual harassment of co-workers. The plaintiff was later exonerated and
brought an intentional interference with prospective contract claim against
his former ermployer. The court found that the employer was entitled to a
privilege similar to that found in defamation cases:
Generally, a former employer who gives a negative reference to a
prospective employer holds some qualified privilege against defamation
suits. By analogy, an employer should hold some privilege against
tortious interference suits for limited statements in response to a direct
request. We conclude, therefore, that an employer may invoke a
conditional privilege to respond to direct inquiries by prospective
employers. '6
160. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 65 and cases cited therein.
161. Id.; see also Delloma, 996 F.2d at 171.
162. KEETONETAL., supra note 63, § 130, at 1010-11. Prosser and Keeton notes that
the qualified privilege is not well-defined, either as to interference with contractual relations
or other relations, and that this privilege has not been applied in many cases. Id.; see also
Saxton, supra note 2, at 65.
163. 996 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1993).
164. Delloma, 996 F.2d at 171-72. The Seventh Circuit expressed some concern in
granting such a qualified privilege because it perceived a trend in the state law away from
permitting employers to make negative statements to third parties about former employees.
Id. at 172 n.4. The court noted the existence of an Illinois statute which prohibited truthful
dissemination *of information concerning employee disciplinary action to third parties. Id.
Nevertheless, the court stated that, "without guidance from the Illinois courts on the
applicability of this statute to tortious interference claims, we will follow the generally
accepted rule that employers may hold a limited privilege." Id.
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B. Negligent Misrepresentation
Employers that provide reference information on former employees
have a broader band of liability under the tort of negligent misrepresen-
tation than they do under the tort of interference with economic advantage.
Liability of the former employer in negligent misrepresentation cases may
extend to the other employer, its employees, and any third parties that
deal to their detriment with the employee for whom references are sup-
plied."
Two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide useful
starting points in analyzing the applicability of this tort to employers that
give references on former employees:
Section 311. Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical
Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to
liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reason-
able reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in
peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.'6
Liability stems either from failure to make a proper investigation or from
knowledge that the information provided was incorrect. 167 Recovery
extends to all persons who are likely to be injured in reliance on the infor-
mation conveyed.
168
A second section of the Restatement addresses a slightly different
liability that includes, but is not limited to, misrepresentation:
165. No reported cases to date hold an employer liable for failure to give a reference
to a prospective employer on an employee with dangerous propensities. However, many
commentators suggest that such a duty is looming and will be defined in a new tort of
"negligent referral." See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1645; Kirk Johnson, Why References
Aren't "Available Upon Request": A New Fear of Lawsuits Is Tightening Everyone's Lips,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1985, at F8; William C. Martucci & Daniel B. Boatright, Immunity
for Employment References, EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Summer 1995, at 119; Janet
Novack, What If the Guy Shoots Somebody?, FORBES, Dec. 4, 1995, at 37; Phillip M.
Perry, Cut Your Risk When Giving References, HR Focus, May 1995, at 15.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1977).
167. Id. cmt. d.
168. Id. cmt. b.
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Section 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his under-
taking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the under-
taking.
169
Although few cases apply misrepresentation theories to the employment
arena,' 70 one case, Guztan v. Altair Airlines, Inc. ,171 illustrates the success-
ful use of such causes of action. In Guztan, a female employee of Altair
Airlines sued the airline and an employment agency when an Altair em-"
ployee recommended by the employment agency raped her. The accused
employee had informed the employment agency during his interview that
he had been convicted for rape two years before his interview, but insisted
that the victim had been his girlfriend while stationed in Germany and that
he was convicted simply because it was a policy of the military courts to
appease foreign women who made such charges."
Although this information was passed on to an Altair official, both by
the applicant and by the employment agency, the Altair official hired the
applicant, but did not reveal the information or take any particular precau-
tions to notify or protect Altair's employees. The employee raped the
plaintiff a year later. The jury found that the plaintiff's injury was caused
by the negligeice of both defendants. On.appeal, the court affirmed the
liability of both parties, referring to the principles found in Section 3 11 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts'17 that one who "negligently performs a
169. Id. § 323.
170. Most cases addressing the issue of negligent misrepresentation do so in the
commercial area where the harm is financial rather than physical. See, e.g., United States
v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 697-701 (1961) (buyer used theory of negligent misrepresenta-
tion when she relied to her detriment on FHA appraisal that failed to discover serious
problems with house). But see Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 354-55 (Cal. 1968) (foster
mother successfully sued for negligent misrepresentation in connection with foster child who
was placed in her home and who subsequently assaulted her). In Johnson, the plaintiff
argued that she had relied on the state youth authorities to give her any necessary warnings
about the youth. The court agreed that the state authorities had a duty to warn the plaintiff
of the "homicidal tendencies, and ... background violence" of the youth. Id. at 354.
171. 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
172. Guztan v. Altair Airlines, Inc., 766 F.2d 135, 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
173. The court also invoked RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1977), which
imposes liability on those who negligently perform an undertaking for another and thereby
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service or makes a misrepresentation involving a risk of physical harm to
a third person, may be held liable for the injury to the third person caused
by defendant's negligence." 174
In Zampatori v. United Parcel Service,75 an employee sued his em-
ployer for improperly discharging him after reading a detective agency's
mistaken report that the employee was a thief.'76 The court in that case
described the necessary elements of a negligent misrepresentation suit as
follows:
(1) [Kjnowledge or its equivalent that the information is required for a
serious purpose; (2) that the party to whom it is given intends to rely and
act upon it; (3) injury [to] person or property because of such reliance; and
(4) the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or otherwise, is
such that in morals and good conscience one party has the right to rely upon
the other for information and the other owed a duty to give it with care."7
It is possible to extrapolate from cases such as these a potential cause
of action by a prospective employer, or his employees, against a former
employer for negligent referral.77 However, courts clearly have not yet
established a blanket duty on the part of a former employer to disclose
negative information about a former employee to prospective employers.179
C. Intentional Misrepresentation
There is little doubt that an employer may be held liable for intentional
misrepresentation of an employee's references. Prosser and Keeton notes
that the required intent is "the intent that a representation shall be made,
that it shall be directed to a particular person or class of persons, that it
shall convey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed, and that it shall be
cause harm to a third person who was placed at risk. Guztan, 766 F.2d at 140.
174. Guztan, 766 F.2d at 140.
175. 479 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
176. Zampatori v. United Parcel Serv., 479 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
The employee won the case even though he did not stand in privity with the detective
agency. The court held that the lack of privity would not prevent him from bringing his
cause of action because the liability did not arise from the parties' relationship, but from a
common-law duty "to act and to speak with care" so as not to injure another. Id. at 474.
177. Id. at 472 (citing International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 155 N.E. 662, 664
(1927)).
178. See generally Swerdlow, supra note 2. Swerdlow and others argue for the creation
of the tort of "negligent referral," proposing that employers should have a duty to warn in
referral situations. For our assessment of this theory, see infra notes 262-313 and accompa-
nying text.
179. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text.
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acted upon in a certain way." 1  As discussed by one court: "[T]he tort of
misrepresentation requires that the tortfeasor must (1) know that he is
making a false statement and (2) intend to induce reliance of his victim." 8
One case settled before trial illustrates the use of this theory. In Jerner
v. Allstate Insurance Co., an employee shot and killed three executives
of the Fireman's Fund Insurance Agency in retaliation for his discharge
many months earlier. Unbeknownst to those at Fireman's Fund, the
gunman had been discharged for carrying a gun to his previous job at the
Allstate Insurance Company. In a suit filed for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, the plaintiffs alleged that Allstate, in an effort "to eliminate an un-
pleasant and potentially dangerous.., problem,""' gave the employee a
reference signed by a company vice president stating that the employee was
let go in a downsizing, but failing to give the real reasons for his discharge.
The plaintiffs supported their argument that Allstate's actions constituted
fraud, among other things, by contrasting Allstate's neutral reference letter
to Fireman's Fund with an Allstate supervisor's deposition taken in prepara-
tion for trial in which the supervisor conceded that the employee was a
"total lunatic" who threatened others.
184
D. Negligent Hiring
Negligent hiring is a relatively recent tort that applies to situations in
which employers hire employees with dangerous tendencies that the em-
ployer could have discovered upon reasonable investigation, but did not.I"
Although employers generally are liable only for the acts of their employees
occurring within the scope of their employment,"l the theory of negligent
hiring holds employers liable for acts of their employees committed outside
the scope of employment. "8
180. KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 107, at 741.
181. Kolikofv. Samuelson, 488 F. Supp. 881, 883 (D. Mass. 1980); see also Skopic,
supra note 2, at 447 n.116.
182. No. 93-09472 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993) (settled), cited in Rovella, supra note 4.
183. Id. (quoting plaintiff).
184. Id.
185. See RONALD M. GREEN & RICHARD J. REIBSTEIN, NEGLIGENT HIRING, FRAUD,
DEFAMATION, AND OTHER AREAS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY (BNA Special Report No. 7,
1988); Saxton, supra note 2, at 75; Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1649.
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219(1), 228 (1958).
187. Id. § 219(2) ("A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting
outside the scope of their employment unless ... (b) the master is negligent or reckless.");
see also id. § 213 cmt. d; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1977).
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In a negligent hiring suit, the acts for which the plaintiff seeks recov-
ery typically are based on violent behavior or other offenses (such as sexual
harassment or theft) of the employee.l"' Liability derives from the em-
ployer's duty to protect employees, customers, clients, and visitors from
injury caused by an employee that the employer "knows or should know
pose[s] a risk of harm to others."' 89 The duty is imposed by common law
and is breached by an employer that fails to exercise reasonable care to see
that those who come in contact with employees are free from risk of harm
posed by unfit employees."9
If an employer breaches such a duty, the employer may be found liable
either for negligent hiring or negligent retention. The duty with respect to
negligent hiring arises at the time of hiring. At this point, the employer has
the responsibility to conduct a reasonable investigation 9' regarding the em-
ployee's suitability for the job. Having failed to determine the employee's
suitability for a job, the employer may be liable even for intentional torts
or criminal activity committed by the employee outside the workplace."9
The extent of this duty is still being defined. Because prospective
employers cannot readily glean information from former employers in
today's legal climate, the investigation of prospective employees has been
made more difficult and may not be as thorough or reliable as it used to be.
Under the tort of negligent hiring, the plaintiff, typically a co-worker,
customer, or client, seeks to prove that: (1) the employee who caused the
injury was unfit for hire; (2) the employer's hiring of the unfit employee
was the cause of injury; and (3) "the employer knew, or should have
known, of the employee's unfitness."'"I
A recent case in Colorado suggests that the duty to investigate applies
to all employees who come into contact with the public, including custodial
workers."9 In this case, a janitor at a McDonald's restaurant assaulted a
188. See GREEN & REiBSTEiN, supra note 185, at 7.
189. Id.
190. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 283 (1977).
191. The determination of what is reasonable depends on the nature of the job. If, for
example, the position involves the carrying of guns, as in the case of a security guard, then
the background check is far more comprehensive. GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 185, at
5; see also Saxton, supra note 2, at 75 n.108.
192. See, e.g., Gaines v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(mail clerk assaulted secretary at her home and court of appeals remanded case for trial,
stating that when employee alleges that employer knew or should have known of employee's
dangerous propensities, employer may be held liable).
193. See GREEN & REIBSTEIN, supra note 185, at 8, and cases cited therein.
194. See Jim McKay, Job Reference Roulette, PiTt. POST-GAZETrE, Aug. 6, 1995, at
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three-year-old child. The company was required to pay over $200,000 in
damages to the child. The employee, who previously had been jailed for
child molestation, was recommended for the job by a state agency whose
counselor knew of the conviction, but failed to mention it to McDonald's.19
The duty to investigate potentially dangerous employees does not end
once a worker has been hired. Even if an employee has no history of
dangerous behavior prior to seeking employment, the employer must
monitor the workplace to ensure that unacceptable behavior does not arise
after a hiring decision has been made. The failure to monitor the work-
place may give rise to the companion tort of negligent retention, that is,
employers that learn or should have learned of their employees' dangerous
tendencies must not continue to employ such individuals. For example,
turning a deaf ear to complaints of sexual harassment may give rise to a
successful negligent retention claim. In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club
Co.,196 an employee complained to the club manager that the chef was
sexually harassing her, thereby causing her to be nervous, humiliated, and
depressed. The manager failed to act, and the woman successfully sued for
negligent retention. On appeal, the court indicated that when an employer
has notice of an employee's proclivity to engage in sexually offensive
behavior, the employer is liable for the negligent retention of such an
employee. 19
V. Recent Legislative Initiatives: The Shield Laws
A number of state legislatures have recently enacted a new generation
of shield laws designed to provide greater protection to employers that
provide job references.198 We have examined those statutes enacted in
thirteen states, most of which passed within the last twelve to fourteen
months.199 As discussed below, we contend that these statutes, which vary
Cl. The case appears to be unreported in federal or state reporters.
195. See id. According to a recent survey by the National Institute of Mental Health,
the "typical [sex] offender molests an average of 117 children before being stopped." This
is so because those who know will rarely report the experience. Even those who are
caught - such as a coach, teacher, or other care provider - are generally able to negotiate
the nature of future references or exit the situation without a paper trail because the whole
matter is so unseemly that people do not want to face the embarrassment and trauma of
filing charges. See Newmeyer, supra note 3.
196. 340 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. 1986).
197. Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 124 (N.C. 1986).
198. See McMorris, supra note 11; see also Tawn Nhan, New Law Makes Thorough
Reference Checks Easier, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 13, 1996, at 2D.
199. The statutes we surveyed include: ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.160 (Michie 1994); ARIZ.
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significantly from state to state, do not provide adequate protection to em-
ployers to encourage them to abandon their no-reference policies.'
We have examined these statutes with respect to four issues: (1) the
establishment of standards that presume that employers have acted properly
when providing job references; (2) the type of job-reference information
that employers may disclose; (3) to whom job-reference information may
be disclosed; and (4) the standard of proof it takes to rebut the presumption
in each state.
A. The Rebuttable Presumption of Proper Behavior
Most of the states surveyed establish presumptive standards that
employers have acted properly in providing job references. In virtually all
instances, the states provide a "good faith presumption," 201 that is, an
employee wishing to challenge a negative job reference will bear the burden
of demonstrating that the employer did not act in good faith.
B. The Type of Information Protected
Most of the state statutes provide that the information subject to the
good faith immunity must pertain to "job performance, "I0 although at least
one state provides immunity merely for information about the former
employee. 3 Several states extend the information subject to the good faith
REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 1982 & Supp.
1996); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1053 (West 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114 (West
1986 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN § 23:291 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 598
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 40, § 61 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp.
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996).
200. See infra notes 331-43 and accompanying text.
201. One state, Louisiana, phrases the presumption in the negative: "so long as the em-
ployer is not acting in bad faith . ." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:291 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1996).
202. See, e.g.,ALASKASTAT. § 9.65.160 (Michie 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
2-114 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 598 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-
12-1 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996).
203. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996) ("An employer that
discloses information about a current or former employee is immune from civil liability for
the disclosure and the consequences proximately caused by the disclosure, unless it is proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed was known to be false at
the time the disclosure was made.").
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presumption to qualifications of an applicant and the reasons for the
employee's discharge or voluntary departure.' 4 One state, Georgia,
provides immunity for statements concerning any violations of state law by
the former employee as well as for statements concerning the applicant's
ability, or lack thereof, to carry out the job.'
C. To Whom Reference Information May Be Disclosed
Almost all the states provide immunity only for statements made
subject to a request by a prospective employer or the former employee.'
Oklahoma requires the consent of the former employee before a former
employer can disseminate job information to prospective employers.' In
most of the states, the request need not be in writing. Only two states
require the employer to send a copy to the former employee. 20
D. The Standard of Proof to Rebut the Presumption
Protecting Employers
Of those states that set a specific standard of proof to rebut the good
faith presumption in favor of employers that give job references, seven
specifically require a "preponderance of the evidence" standard.' This is
the typical standard in civil actions. We presume that those states that have
not specified a standard of proof would apply this standard by default.
Three states require that the employee rebut the good faith presumption "by
clear and convincing evidence"210 - a standard that is theoretically higher
204. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1053 (West 1989) ("Upon request, employer may disclose the
reason for the discharge of an employee or why an employee voluntarily left the service of
the employer."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 23:291 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996) ("accurate
information about a current or former employee's job performance or reasons for separa-
tion").
205. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996).
206. New Mexico does not specifically require that the request come from a prospective
employer to fit within the immunity. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-12-1 (Michie 1995).
207. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 61 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
208. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361 (West Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 8-2-114 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
209. ALASKA STAT. § 9.65.160 (Michie 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114
(West 1986 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODEANN. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-
5-3-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 23:291 (West 1985 & Supp.
1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 61 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996).
210. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 26, § 598 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996).
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than the preponderance standard. Whether this higher standard will make
a difference in actual litigation is unclear.
Having described the various theories of liability applicable to
employment-reference cases and some efforts to reform the law, we now
discuss why we believe the law must be changed and then advance several
proposals for reform.
VT The Need for Reform
As detailed above, in response to fears of litigation over charges such
as defamation,"' blacklisting,"' tortious interference with prospective em-
ployment,213 negligence, 214 violating service-letter statutes, 25 racial discrim-
ination,21 6 sexual discrimination,2 7 or misrepresentation218 employers in-
creasingly have moved in the direction of nondisclosure of references.
Either they have stopped giving references219 or they have adopted the so-
called NRSN approach (name, rank, and serial number) in which employers
provide only the most neutral information about current or past employees
when asked for references.'
Despite their growing refusal to provide references about current or
past employees, employers paradoxically continue to seek references ag-
gressively when looking to hire new employees." Their actions in seeking
references arise from the same concern that leads them to refuse to provide
211. See supra notes 52-151 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 165-79, 185-97 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 165-84 and accompanying text.
219. Saxton, supra note 2, at 47-48 (citing numerous surveys of business managers that
indicate that "a significant percentage of companies in the United States are responding to
the current employment-reference environment by adopting 'no comment' or otherwise
limited reference strategies"); see also Acoff, supra note 2, at 755; Johnson, supra note 165;
Newmeyer, supra note 3.
220. A number of employers continue to provide strictly neutral information about
employees, such as confirmation of employment, title of job, and dates of employment, but
balk at sharing information that is in any way evaluative. See Peter Dalpe, Job References
Can Be Elusive, NEW HAVEN REG., Aug. 29, 1995, at D1 (noting that large number of
companies "refuse to divulge job-related information to prospective employers - even if the
information is honest and factual").
221. Id. (noting that reference-checking has increased ten-fold since 1979 scandal
involving Washington Post reporter who faked her credentials).
1423
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381 (1996)
references - fear of lawsuits. Employers seeking new employees particu-
larly fear negligent hiring m or negligent retention' charges if they hire an
individual with a discoverable history of dangerous tendencies that the
employers failed to unearth.
A. Few Successful Lawsuits, but Many Real Concerns
Interestingly, despite employers' fears of litigation, available statistics
suggest that their fears, although real, probably are exaggerated. Notwith-
standing the concerns often expressed about a runaway tort system, a recent
study by the National Center for State Courts notes that "[a]lthough torts are
currently center stage in the civil litigation debate, there is no evidence that
the number of tort cases is increasing. In fact, the volume of tort litigation
has declined steadily since 1990." These findings extend to employment
cases. According to a recent New York Times report, "[t]he actual number
of cases in which an employee has sued a former boss over a bad refer-
ence ... is relatively small, probably no more than several hundred. More-
over, the cases ... have been difficult for the plaintiffs to win .... "m
To say that few employment-reference lawsuits are brought and that
fewer are successful is not to say that the problem is insignificant. Some
employer concerns about litigation are quite real. In particular, employer
worries about the costs, trauma, and inconvenience of litigation - even if
employers win lawsuits' - appear to be genuine.' Moreover, should an
222. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
224. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS,
1994: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 7 (1996) [hereinafter
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS STUDY]; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change,
37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 483-539 (1990) (detailing broad doctrinal change among courts to
favor defendants in tort cases beginning in early to mid-1980s); Gary T. Schwartz, The Begin-
ning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 603
(1992) (arguing that liability expansion of 1960s and 1970s has come to end and that we may
now be in era of liability contraction); Roxanne Barton Conlin, Litigation Explosion Disputed,
NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1991, at 26. Moreover, juries appear to be more defendant-oriented in
recent years. According to Jury Verdict Research, a firm that publishes national jury verdict
trends, "juries nationwide have become markedly tougher on people who sue doctors, insur-
-ance companies and other deep-pocket defendants, siding less often with plaintiffs. And there
is evidence that the size of the awards has leveled off, too." Richard Perez-Pefia, U.S. Juries
Grow Tougher on Those Seeking Damages, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1994, at Al.
225. See Johnson, supra note 165.
226. See Robert M. Ackerman, Bringing Coherence to Defamation Law Through Uniform
Legislation: The Search for an Elegant Solution, 72 N.C. L. REv. 291, 300 (1994) (noting that
in context of defamation litigation, "[a]ll ... litigation costs money, especially for defendants,
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employer lose a case, the odds of being assessed punitive damages - al-
though small' - appear to be high compared to other types of tort cases.
According to the study by the National Center for State Courts, "[e]mploy-
ment-related cases, which almost always include an associated tort claim
(e.g., discrimination, harassment), account for 41 percent of all punitive
damages awarded." 9
B. The Beneficent Employer's Dilemma
To say the least, employers dislike being placed in a Catch-22 situation
that requires them to act in an utterly inconsistent manner - that is, "trying
to resist inquiries from other companies while prying for information [them-
selves].""2 In fact, those most threatened by this situation likely will be
beneficent employers that feel a personal or social commitment to warn
who pay by the hour for legal services. As a result, defendants effectively lose even when
they ultimately prevail in litigation."). Ackerman cites the example of a small scholarly
journal that incurred in excess of one million dollars in legal expenses while "successfully"
defending a case in which summary judgment ultimately was granted, but not until the case
had been litigated for seven years. Id. at 300 n.45.
227. Even if an employer wins a lawsuit brought by a disgruntled past or current em-
ployee, the employer must still undergo the time, expense, and worry of defending such a suit.
These costs are not inconsiderable. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 76 (noting that under so-called
"American Rule," each side in most employment-related litigation must pay its own attorney
fees, thereby "foster[ing] conservative reference practices, and . . . discourag[ing] open
reference strategies"); Deborah S. Kleiner, Is Silence Truly Golden? HRMagazine, July 1993,
at BI ("When you add... the costs of legal fees incurred even if the employees' lawsuits are
unsuccessful, the expenses of such litigation can be prohibitive."); Dan Rutherford, Legal
Worries Gag Fnployers on Requests for Worker Referrals, TULSA TRIB. & TULSA WORLD, Dec.
10, 1995, at B1 (quoting several legal experts as justifying their advice to clients not to give
references because of unacceptably expensive costs - as high as $10,000-$25,000 - of
defending lawsuits, even if successful); see also Roselle L. Wissler, Media Libel Litigation: A
Search for More Effective Dispute Resolution, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 471-72 (1990)
(noting that, despite fact that media defendants win 90% of reported defamation cases, average
time for case to be resolved is four years and average attorney fees are $96,000 in media def-
amation suits). According to Wissler, "the chilling effect of libel suits today is due more to
litigation costs and intrusion into the editorial process than to adverse judgments." Id. at 472.
228. Only about four percent of tort cases reported in the study by the National Center
for State Courts resulted in the award of punitive damages. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS STUDY, supra note 224, at 37.
229. Id.
230. Dalpe, supra note 220 (paraphrasing employment manager for hospital in
Wallingford, Connecticut); see Michael R. Losey, Random Checking: Make It a Company
Policy, MANAGING OFF. TECH., May 1, 1994, at 54, 54 (noting that interviewing and hiring
have almost become Catch-22 situations in which "[e]mployers can be sued for divulging
too much information about former employees and sued for obtaining too little information
about new employees").
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others away from hiring dangerous or incompetent employees. What con-
fronts them is a variation of the prisoner's dilemma,"1 in which bestowing
beneficence reciprocally produces a favorable outcome, but doing so unilater-
ally results in an unacceptable outcome for those who act selflessly.
For example, in a universe consisting of only two employers, each
would benefit greatly if both sought and shared references freely. If, how-
ever, both sought reference information, but only one provided it, then the
"free rider" would receive all of the benefits while sharing none of the risks.
That is, free rider employers would have acquired useful reference informa-
tion, thereby facing the lowest risk of hiring dangerous or incompetent
employees (or of being sued for negligent hiring), but they would have
divulged no negative reference information, thereby facing the lowest risk of
suit by disgruntled past or current employees. In simplified form, this is
illustrated below:
Employer 2 seeks and Employer 2 seeks but
provides references does not provide ref-
erences
Employer 1 seeks Both employers benefit Employer 2 receives
and provides refer- from each other's infor- all of the benefits, but
ences mation; however, both shares none of the
face risk of lawsuits risks (free-rides).
from past employees.
Employer 1 seeks but Employer 1 receives all Neither employer ben-
does not provide ref- of the benefits, but efits from the other's
erences shares none of the risks information, but both
(free-rides). may have a reduced
risk of negligent hiring
lawsuits.
The table illustrates a particularly perverse aspect of the current system.
In the classic prisoner's dilemma, the parties clearly benefit the most when
they trust and cooperate with one another,132 but that is a highly debatable
proposition in the employment-reference context. It is possible that an em-
231. See Robert Axelrod, The Problem of Cooperation, in NEGOTIATION: READINGS,
EXERCISES, AND CASES 71-79 (Roy Lewicki et al. eds., 1983) (noting that "prisoners
dilemma is simply an abstract formulation of some very common . . . situations in which
what is best for each person individually leads to mutual [lack of cooperation,] whereas
everyone would have been better off with mutual cooperation").
232. Id.
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ployer might decide that it would be better off in a completely uncooperative
setting, that is, where both employers seek but neither provides information.
In such a setting, although the employer would be at an increased risk of
hiring bad employees, it would face little likelihood of being sued success-
fully. 23
C. The Social Impact of the Current System
We find the current system unacceptable for a variety of reasons. First,
on a societal level, the system produces a widespread withholding of critical
reference information' that undermines an economic efficiency.3' If
prospective employers cannot easily obtain reliable information about job
applicants, they will either devote an inordinate amount of time and effort
seeking it or they will forego it. In either case, the economy's efficiency is
undermined. In the former case, personnel investigative costs will grow to
onerous levels," 5 and in the latter case, the number of unacceptable hires will
grow, producing higher employee turnover 7 and personnel replacement
costs.?
8
Second, without useful reference information, prospective employers
face greater difficulties in determining which employees present dangers to
them, their workers, or to the public. Tragic examples abound regarding the
233. Because both seek information, although neither acquires it, both arguably would
be less likely to be held liable on a negligent hiring claim. Similarly, because neither
provides information, past employees would have no basis for suing them for giving
negative references.
234. Although no precise count has been made of the number of employment references
sought by prospective employers, they surely must number in the millions. See Tiefer,
supra note 2, at 146. Estimates of the number of employers that seek job references range
from 50% to over 90%, depending on the size of the industry being examined. Id.
Professor Saxton argues convincingly that "honest, detailed references from former employ-
ers are among the most useful types of information" that prospective employers can use in
determining which applicants will be good employees. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 49.
235. See Dalpe, supra note 220 (noting that personnel managers say that "current
situation hurts the economy by not allowing companies to work efficiently and cooperate
with one another").
236. See Losey, supra note 230, at 56 (citing survey of employment managers at
Fortune 500 companies indicating that cost of hiring employee is approximately $9,200, of
which major portion is reference-checking).
237. See Gregory Stricharchuk, Fired Employees Turn the Reason for Dismissal into a
Legal Weapon, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 33 (citing employment expert who "blames
inadequate reference information for the high turnover of employees" in California's
financial institutions).
238. See Losey, supra note 230, at 56 (noting that "cost of terminating an employee is
anywhere from three to six times the amount it costs to hire").
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failure of past employers to warn about pilots with poor flight skills, 9 about
troubled employees who carried weapons to work,2' or about incompetent
or sexually predatory physicians. 2"M Given the increasing national concern
about workplace violence, 2 it seems imperative that employers have access
to information that could save lives and avoid injury. Although employers
increasingly search criminal records for information about applicants' violent
proclivities, doing so is an expensive and time-consuming process. 243 More-
over, employers must tread warily in searching out and using information
based on criminal records lest they run afoul of laws that prohibit discrimina-
tion based on such records.' Were employee-reference information more
available, employers would not need to rely so heavily on these alternative
sources of information.
Third, not only does reduced access to reference information result in
more bad employees being hired, it also places roadblocks in front of out-
standing employees. Employees whose former employers refuse to provide
239. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (listing articles discussing cases involving
pilot error and discussing same).
240. See Rovella, supra note 4 (citing example of troubled employee who was fired for
carrying weapon at work, but given good reference when he left). Subsequently, the employee
was fired from his new job and, in response, murdered three executives at the new job. Id.
241. See Susan Schmidt, Out-of-State Move Averts Discipline, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
1988, at A17; Michael Specter, Army Had Evidence on Doctor Accused of Sodomy, WASH.
POST, Dec. 7, 1985, at Dl; see also P. Budetti, Title IV, Public Law 99-660: Background and
Implications, 74 FED'N BULL. 363, 365 (Dec. 1987) (citing several "highly visible examples"
of incompetent or unprofessional physicians moving from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in
exchange for silence or favorable recommendations from their previous organizations).
242. See FRANCIS D'ADDARIO, THE MANAGER'S VIOLENCE SURVIVAL GUIDE 8 (1995)
(noting that, in 1993, workplace homicides rose 6% to 1063 and that "homicide is the number
one cause of death for women on the job ... the number two cause of death for all workers");
William C. Martucci & Denise Drake Clemow, Workplace Violence: Incidents - and
Liability - on the Rise, EMPLOYMENT REL. TODAY, Winter 1994/1995, at 463 (noting that
"[a]s violent incidents have increased, potential liability for employers has also climbed");
Jonathan A. Segal, When Charles Manson Comes to the Workplace: Violence in the Workplace,
HRMagazine, June 1994, at 33 ("There are more than 2 million physical assaults in the
workplace per year. In addition, more than 7,000 workplace homicides occur annually,
accounting for 12 percent of workplace deaths.").
243. See Stephen G. Hirsch, Catch 22: Checking Job References Proves to be Risky
Business, THE RECORD, March 21, 1994, at Cl (noting that publicly available criminal records
may be available to employers only in limited circumstances). Moreover, such records
typically fail to include arrests that do not result in convictions. Id.
244. Id.; see also Alfred G. Feliu, Workplace Violence and the Duty of Care: The Scope
of an Employer's Obligation to Protect Against the Violent Employee, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.
381, 393 (1994) (noting that "[m]ost states prohibit employers from discriminating based on
arrest records under any circumstances and on prior convictions unless a direct relationship
exists between the prior conviction and the job at issue").
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employee references lose the opportunity to have their outstanding records
shown to prospective employers. Employers that find themselves unable to
get a meaningful reference about a job applicant are less likely to hire the
applicant than they are to hire one with good references.245 Professor
Saxton, for example, cites a survey indicating that forty-four percent of
responding executives would view a former employer's refusal to comment
on an employment candidates's performance as a detriment to that candi-
date's application. 2I
Fourth, when job references are unavailable prospective employers may
turn to less reliable or more inappropriate information. Increasingly, as
employers find access to reference information blocked, they seek physical,
psychological, and drug tests,247 some of which may have limited predictive
value.2' Employers may also increasingly look to applicants' credit histo-
ries, a practice that raises privacy concerns. 249
Fifth, although difficult to document empirically, employees who realize
that their performance with one employer will never become known to future
employers might take a more casual attitude toward doing a good job than
those who know that their work history will follow them from job to job.
With less at stake in doing a good job, irresponsible employees may devote
less attention to their jobs than they would if information about their unac-
ceptable behavior were likely to be passed from employer to employer.
Sixth, because no-reference policies are so offensive, they are often
undermined, 50 In some cases, shrewd reference-checkers sidestep restric-
245. See Paul W. Barada, Check References with Care, NATION'S Bus., May 1993, at 54
("Nothing puts up a 'red flag' in the mind of the prospective employer quicker than a reference
who is unwilling to talk about a former employee. If a former employer refuses to comment,
the caller may assume it's because something is wrong with the applicant."); McMorris, supra
note 11 (citing human resources manager who complained that "no-reference" policies
prevented him from giving "glowing" references); see also Kleiner, supra note 227, at 117
(noting that "many employers construe a no-reference response as a negative reference").
246. See Robert Half Survey, supra note 20; see also McMorris, supra note 11 (citing
human resources manager who notes that "no reference" policy penalizes good employees and
indicates that he "never hires people whose former employers won't give more complete
references").
247. See Johnson, supra note 165 (noting that "[tlhese days prospective employees are
more often required to undergo testing - written psychological examinations and drug-
detecting urinalysis").
248. See Louis Trager, Tough Job: Giving, Getting References, S.F. EXAM'R, July 18,
1993, at El (noting limited predictive value of such tests).
249. See Johnson, supra note 165; see also Dalpe, supra note 220.
250. See Phillip M. Perry, The Risks of Employment References, SAVINGS & COMMUNITY
BANKER, Feb. 1995, at 32 (noting that there is "dangerous temptation for people to violate no-
reference policies").
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tions established by companies' human resources departments through
appeals to job seekers' former supervisors or co-workers."' In others,
former employers, through winks and nods, manage to convey their feelings
about former employees.52 In still other instances, regrettably naive former
employers will give favorable recommendations for past good employees, but
adopt no comment approaches when asked about past employees whom they
view negatively. One serious problem with these informal approaches is the
high probability of message confusion and misunderstanding. An employer
trying to send a signal that a former employee deserves scrutiny may do this
so subtly that a prospective employer may miss the signal. Conversely, a
message of high approval may be so muted that a prospective employer may
read disapproval. Moreover, employers that engage in winks and nods may
not truly insulate themselves from liability once their practice is exposed.
VI. The Challenge: No Perfect Solutions
As we have discussed, the law and employers' practices regarding
employment references have evolved over time.3 In recent years, they have
placed great weight on the protection of workers against arbitrary and unjust
employer actions5 4 Although it is difficult to argue that employers should
be given greater discretion to abuse their employees, we note that the courts'
expansion of the opportunities for employees to take their grievances to court
carries substantial costs both for innocent employers and, more significantly,
for the public generally. These costs must be noted and addressed.
251. See McKay, supra note 194 ("To get around a company policy on no references,
hiring agents often avoid a company's human resources department and seek out a job appli-
cant's former supervisor or coworkers for information. Calling them at home is one trick.").
252. See Johnson, supra note 165. According to Johnson:
With all this, companies are still trying to communicate with one another about
employees. But, to be safe, many are entering into an odd legalistic dance that
involves a great deal of tiptoeing around information and opinion.
Astute prospective employers have learned to listen between the lines. "If
an employer really feels strongly about an ex-employee, regardless of the rule, he
will say, 'John was terrific, we hated to lose him. However, our official policy is
to say this and this,"' said Jose Rivera, a Brooklyn-based attorney who handles
employment discrimination cases. "It's a new way of being damned with faint
praise if all the employer does is provide a neutral reference - to say, 'yes, the
person worked here."'
Id.
253. See supra notes 11-51 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 11-51 and accompanying text.
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A. The Need to Balance Competing Interests
Unfortunately, reform rarely comes cost-free. This is particularly so
with the issue of employee references. To understand this point, the reader
should consider the following scenarios:
Scenario 1. Joe, a harasser, seeks new employment
Joe and Suzy are colleagues at Apex Manufacturing Company. Joe
sexually harasses Suzy for weeks until she complains to her supervisor.
Joe is punished and is warned to cease his improper behavior. Despite
this, Joe persists and, after an investigation, is fired. Joe promptly seeks
employment with Smith Manufacturing Company. Smith's personnel
office then seeks a reference from Apex. Apex informs Smith of Joe's
history and Joe is turned down for the job. Joe then sues Apex on a
variety of tort theories.
Scenario 2. Mary, a victim, seeks new employment
Mary works at Widget Manufacturing Company as Sam's adminis-
trative assistant. She is an exemplary employee. Sam sexually harasses
Mary. Mary resists Sam's overtures and is immediately fired. Fearful
of litigation and hoping to put the matter behind her, Mary decides not
to sue Sam or Widget. Thereafter, Mary seeks employment with Quality
Manufacturing Company. Sam, still furious at Mary for rebuffing him,
angrily states that Mary was terminated for incompetence and insubordi-
nation. Quality turns Mary down for the job. Mary then sues Sam and
Widget on a variety of tort theories.
In an ideal legal setting, Joe's frivolous lawsuit would not prevail. In
fact, given the substantial time, worry, and cost associated with fighting
Joe's claim, Apex should be able to have the case dismissed before trial or,
at a minimum, to require Joe to reimburse Apex for its costs and attorney
fees. Similarly, in an ideal setting, Mary should not only prevail, she should
be awarded substantial damages (including punitive damages) for Sam's
malicious behavior.
But, here lies the dilemma. To the extent that society develops rules
and procedures to protect companies like Apex from frivolous suits, society
erects barriers that hamper victims like Mary from obtaining justice. Con-
versely, to the extent that society provides substantial legal weaponry for
victims like Mary, society creates greater opportunities for abuse of the legal
system by individuals like Joe who are prepared to press meritless claims
because they are desperate, deluded, or calculating.
For example, in addition to being an unrepentant sexual harasser, Joe
may be an accomplished liar, able to bamboozle a judge or jury into believ-
ing that the charges against him stemmed from a misunderstanding rather
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than from his improper behavior. If so, Joe might succeed in a lawsuit in
which the burden of proof is low and no particular privilege is accorded to
employers' references. On the other hand, if the law imposes a high stan-
dard of proof on employment lawsuits or provides employers with a strong
privilege against legal claims, Joe might be rebuffed by the courts. Unfortu-
nately, so might Mary in her case against Sam and his company.
Accordingly, we object to approaches that oversimplify the choices
available to policymakers. Those who insist that strengthening employers'
rights to provide references affects only incompetent or dishonest workers' 5
miss the mark as widely as those who insist that expanding employee rights
to challenge negative references harms only those who disclose false informa-
tion. 6 To the contrary, adding protections for well-intentioned employers
to provide references necessarily creates the potential for harmful, vindictive
employers to avoid being called to task. Similarly, maintaining the current
tilt towards employee rights indisputably discourages numerous well-inten-
tioned employers from sharing references, thus easing the way for incompe-
tent or dangerous employees to shift jobs with little difficulty.
Unfortunately, no perfect solution exists.' As a starting point, one
must optimize the conflicting interests of employers and employees. The
interests to be.addressed are as follows:
Employers' Interests Employees' Interests
* Protect workers and managers 0 Receive fair and honest refer-
* Protect customers ences
* Protect property and premises 0 Receive forgiveness and reha-
• Promote harmonious and non- bilitation
disruptive workplace 0 Have privacy respected
255. See McKay, supra note 194. McKay cites a human resources specialist who
supports greater rights for employers to give references based on the argument that "[i]t's
a win-win situation for everyone except for those people who have something serious to
hide.... Employees who are poor performers, or who are dishonest, they're not going
to want this to happen." Id. As noted, we find this a simplistic view.
256. See id. McKay cites the publisher of a journal devoted to privacy rights as saying,
"'[s]ophisticated employers know that they get into trouble only if they disclose untrue
information. They deserve no immunity from that any more than any other sector of
society.'" Id. Again, in our judgment, this view is overly simplistic.
257. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 113 ("No single proposal can reasonably claim to be
a panacea in this complicated context, especially in light of the legitimacy of the sometimes-
conflicting interests and concerns of employers and employees.").
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Beyond the interests of employers and employees, societal needs also
must be considered. Although it might be commendable that employers seek
to rehabilitate employees with poor job skills, sexual abuse tendencies, or
drug problems, from a societal point of view, rehabilitation must assume a
secondary degree of importance in the case of positions such as pilots, day
care workers, or truck drivers that expose members of the public to risk. 5
Balancing interests between employers and employees must be done in a
manner that does not impose externalities on the public.
B. The Right to Be Wrong
Truth is an elusive goal. In the employment-reference context, in which
judgments about an employee's performance typically include subjective
assessments of such things as attitude, cooperation, enthusiasm, and compe-
tence, one can readily see the difficulties in assessing the truth or falsity of
employers' references. A supervisor may be genuinely convinced that an
employee is incompetent, but lack "smoking gun" evidence in support of this
judgment. Although it is tempting to assert that employers should remain
silent unless they have clearly documentable information about an employee's
shortcomings, such an approach will likely weed out few problem workers,"
258. Along these lines, one might ask whether it is fair to label an employee who hit
another employee on one occasion as violent. As one employment lawyer asked: "Is
somebody [to be] unemployed for the rest of their life for getting into a fist fight?" See
McMorris, supra note 11. Our answer is that, although we would not impose unemploy-
ment for life for such a mistake, we would insist that this information be disclosed and
expect the employee to explain to prospective employers why he or she can be trusted not
to be violent on the job.
259. For example, in a critical job category - physicians - the medical profession
historically has taken action very reluctantly against those accused of incompetence because
of the difficulties in proving such a vague charge. A nationwide review of state disciplinary
actions by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services in 1986
revealed that, although state licensing boards disciplined doctors for easily proved charges
such as writing improper prescriptions or for drug abuse, virtually none of the boards
brought charges of incompetence. See OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAL
LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW 13-14 (1986). This reluctance to take action
has resulted in the presence of a small, but persistent, group of incompetent medical
professionals. See Robert C. Derbyshire, Medical Discipline in Disarray: Retrospective and
Prospective, 19 HOSP. PRAc. 136a, 136b (1984) (estimating that 5% to 10% of doctors are
incompetent); Timothy Stoltafus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to
Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 Hous. L. REv. 525, 538 (1988) (citing studies
indicating that between 4% and 30% of physicians are incompetent); Joel Brinkley, 28,000
Doctors Are Feared Unfit, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1986, at A17; Joel Brinkley, State Medical
Boards Disciplined Record Numbers of Doctors in '85, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1986, at Al
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thereby increasing the risk that incompetent or dangerous employees will
move freely throughout the system.' Accordingly, if a proper reference
system is to be developed, it must permit some well-intentioned employer
opinions about workers' job performances.
An effective system must do more than permit opinions to be expressed.
It must also protect honest error - past or current employers must be free,
in some circumstances, to make assertions about their employees that turn
out to be false or unprovable. Protecting false utterances is perhaps the
major purpose behind affording defendants privilege in defamation
litigation." If not, courts could simply. rule that truth constituted the only
defense to defamation claims - an approach they have never taken.
Why should courts accord false statements in employee references any
protection? If employers face a standard that requires documentation for or
the ability to prove every assertion they make, they will err on the side of
extreme caution, resulting either in no comment policies or in the disclosure
only of the blandest information. Clearly, a more open exchange of informa-
tion is needed.
VIII. Options and Recommendations for Reform
Having noted that no reform seems likely to rectify the current situation
without introducing some accompanying adverse effects, we nevertheless
remain convinced that reform is needed. In Part VIII, we review a number
(noting that even with dramatic increase in number of disciplinary actions brought against
doctors, "most officials believe that too few of the nation's 553,000 licensed physicians
are being disciplined. Medical officials estimate that at any given time at least five out
of every 100 doctors are so incompetent, drunk, or senile, that they should not be prac-
ticing medicine without some form of restriction."). To rectify this situation, Congress
enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(1994).
260. See generally supra note 259.
261. That is, in order to get at the truth, society provides a buffer to utter some false
statements so long as they are not made maliciously. According to the Restatement of Torts,
the idea of privilege provides protection for some false statements because:
Were such protection not given, true information which should be given or
received would not be communicated through fear of the persons capable of
giving it that they would be held liable in an action of defamation unless they
could meet the heavy burden of satisfying a jury that their statements were true.
See RESTATEMENT SCOPE NOTE, supra note 63; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 341 (1973) (arguing that "[t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (noting that state law against libeling public officials must do more
than provide defense of truth; it must also allow for "erroneous statements honestly made").
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of proposed reforms and offer our recommendations with respect to these
approaches. In particular, we discuss: (1) the desirability of imposing an
affirmative duty on employers to disclose to prospective employers negative
information about former employees; (2) the need to reform qualified privi-
lege in defamation and related laws; (3) the appropriateness of having
employees contractually waive their right to challenge negative employment
references; and (4) the usefulness of requiring unsuccessful litigants in
employment-reference cases to pay the costs and attorney fees of the winner.
Finally, we recommend an administrative ADR approach as an alternative to
traditional litigation approaches in employment-reference disputes.
A. Imposing Affirmative Duties of Disclosure on Employers
1. Affirmative Duties in General
An affirmative duty generally requires one to take action to assist
another. Despite the unquestionable moral good in having citizens come to
the aid of others, the law has always approached the imposition of affirma-
tive duties cautiously. 2 Citizens are required neither to be heroes' nor not-
262. REsrATEmENT (SE oND) OF ToRTS § 314 (1977). The Restatement indicates: "The
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." Id.; see
also KEaTON Er AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 373; Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J 886, 887 (1934). According to
Prosser and Keeton, the law's posture derives from the classic distinction between "misfea-
sance" and "nonfeasance." Id. The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact
that by "misfeasance" the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while
by "nonfeasance" he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to
benefit him by interfering in his affairs. Id.
263. Perhaps the classic case on this point is Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959).
In this case, the defendants goaded and taunted Mr. Yania into jumping into a deep trench
of water and then stood by while he drowned. Id. at 344-45. In ruling against the claims
of Yania's estate, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that, "[tihe mere fact that Bigan
saw Yania in a position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal, although a moral,
obligation or duty to go to his rescue ...... Id. at 346.
In listing decisions that deny liability under current law, Prosser and Keeton describes
some as "shocking in the extreme":
The expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope at hand, who sees another drowning
before his eyes, is not required to do anything at all about it, but may sit on the
dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the man drown. A physician is under no
duty to answer the call of one who is dying and might be saved, nor is anyone
required to play the part of Florence Nightingale and bind up the wounds of a
stranger who is bleeding to death, or to prevent a neighbor's child from hammer-
ing on a dangerous explosive, or to remove a stone from the highway where it
is a menace to traffic, or a train from a place where it blocks a fire engine on its
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at-risk rescuers.' Of course, duties arise if one, by one's negligence, has
placed another in danger,' has sought to rescue but has done so in an
improper manner,' or, through an act of negligence, has exposed someone
to an imminent risk in such a manner as to invite rescue by a bystander, 7
but these exceptions traditionally have been fairly limited.
One line of cases that might extend to employment references are those
in which one party owes a duty to another because of the special relationship
of the two parties."8 As we shall discuss, some commentators have argued
that these cases give rise to a past or current employer's duty to warn about
a dangerous employee.
2. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
A California Supreme Court case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of Califormia,269 has been advanced as supporting a duty to warn that could
extend to employment references. In Tarasoff, a patient informed his psy-
chotherapist at the University of California that he intended to murder a
young woman upon her return from a summer in Brazil. Although the
therapist took steps to have the patient briefly committed, he failed to warn
the young woman and when she returned, the patient, who had been released
from custody at the direction of the therapist's supervisor, went to the young
woman's residence and killed her. Subsequently, the parents of the victim
sued the therapist and the University, alleging a negligent failure to warn.
In finding a duty to warn, the California Supreme Court stated:
Although... under the common law, as a general rule, one person
owed no duty to control the conduct of another, . . . nor to warn those
way to save a house, or even to cry a warning to one who is walking into the
jaws of a dangerous machine.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 375.
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T'ORTS § 314 cmt. a (1977).
265. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 378-82.
266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1977). Section 323 states:
One who undertakes... to render services to another which he should recognize
as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if ... his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm.
Id.; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 378-82.
267. This is the so-called "danger invites rescue" doctrine first articulated in Wagner
v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921).
268. See infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text.
269. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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endangered by such conduct. . ., the courts have carved out an excep-
tion to this rule in cases in which the defendant stands in some special
relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or
in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct ... .27
In reaching its finding, the court noted that such a duty had been invoked in
the following situations: a doctor who negligently failed to diagnose a
contagious disease; a doctor who, having diagnosed a contagious disease,
failed to warn members of the patient's family;' and a government agency
that arranged for a dangerous mental patient to work on a local farm without
notifying the family of the patient's background. I
The court added a point arguably relevant to the employment context.
Liability in the Tarasoff case did not depend on the court's judgment that
psychotherapists are necessarily accurate in predicting a patient's likelihood
of committing a violent act. To the contrary, the court acknowledged the
difficulty in making such predictions. 274 Nonetheless, in those instances in
which a therapist does conclude that a patient poses a serious risk, the court
concluded that the therapist must act' 7 because the issue ultimately "is one
of social policy, not professional expertise. "276
270. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976). The
court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1977), which states that a duty of care
may arise from either "(a) a special relation... between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation
.. between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection." Id.
271. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
272. Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959).
273. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409,
418-20 (D.N.D. 1967).
274. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345. According to the court:
We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encounters in attempting to forecast
whether a patient presents a serious danger of violence. Obviously, we do not
require tat the therapist, in making that determination, render a perfect perfor-
mance .... Within the broad range of reasonable practice and treatment in
which professional opinion and judgment may differ, the therapist is free to
exercise his or her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hind-
sight, that he or she judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence.
Id.
275. The therapist must act even though he or she may be wrong: "The risk that
unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price for the lives of possible victims
that may be saved." Id. at 346.
276. Id. at 345-46. According to the court:
[The ultimate question of resolving the tension between the conflicting interests
of patient and potential victim is one of social policy, not professional exper-
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3. Tarasoff and an Employer's Duty to Disclose
Tarasoff has been hailed by Professor Peter Lake as the "PaIsgraf of its
generation, a case with meta-significance which endures beyond its jurisdic-
tion, time, place, and perhaps its particular holding."277 Professor Lake's
conclusion stems, in part, from his sense that Tarasoff challenges the tradi-
tional approach of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that individuals gener-
ally owe no duty of aid or rescue to others. 278 As Lake sees it, the law is
moving in the direction of requiring citizens to take reasonable efforts to aid
or protect others when to do so would take little effort and would pose
minimal risk.279
Although Lake takes no position whether Tarasoff principles should be
extended to impose on former or current employers an affirmative duty to
warn about dangerous employees, at least two thoughtful commentaries have
made this argument recently. In the first, Janet Swerdlow, albeit conceding
that no court has yet done so,' argues that "it would be reasonable for the
courts, when faced with a case of negligent referral, to hold that a former
employer had a duty to warn a prospective employer, or in other words, to
give an honest, accurate, and complete referral." 1 Swerdlow argues that
the duty should arise because, as in Tarasoff, employers stand in a special
relationship with other critical parties.'- In the employment context, there
tise.... In sum, the therapist owes a legal duty not only to his patient, but also
to his patient's would-be victim and is subject in both respects to scrutiny by
judge and jury.
Id. (quoting John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1067 (1974)).
277. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REv. 97, 98 (1995).
278. Id. at 102. As discussed later, see infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text,
we do not agree that Tarasoff is likely to be interpreted as expansively as Lake suggests.
279. Lake joins other scholars in this view. See, e.g., John M. Adler, Relying upon
the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common
Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIs. L. REv. 867, 869; James P.
Murphy, Evolution of the Duty of Care: Some Thoughts, 30 DEPAUL L. REv. 147, 175
(1980).
280. See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1659 ("The Tarasoff analysis has not yet been
applied in a cause of action for negligent referral. It has, however, been applied in the
employment context .. .
281. Id.
282. "Special relationships" typically include those in which one party holds power over
a dependent party or receives economic or other benefits from another party. See KEETON
Er AL., supra note 63, § 56, at 374. The largest group upon whom such an affirmative duty
has been imposed are the owners and occupiers of land. Id. Other examples would also
include a bank and depositor, a passenger and carrier, parent and child, psychotherapist and
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are two such relationships: (1) past or current employers with prospective
employers and (2) past or current employers with their employees. Accord-
ing to Swerdlow, either relationship triggers a duty.tm
With respect to the first relationship - that between employers and
prospective employers - Swerdlow suggests that a duty arises because
employers develop unique knowledge about their employees that generally
would not be known by anyone else. When a prospective employer seeks
information from a past employer, the prospective employer stands in a
"relationship of dependence" I because, it may not be able to obtain critical
information to protect property or persons from any other source. Accord-
ingly, should an employer conclude that a serious risk of harm exists and that
the potential victim is readily identifiable, the employer should be required
to give a warning to prospective employers that seek reference informa-
tion.' According to Swerdlow, failure to give a warning - either by
refusing to disclose any information or by refusing to disclose any negative
information - about traits' that might have a negative impact on a prospec-
patient, and doctor and patient.
283. Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1660-63. As discussed later, see infra notes 303-13
and accompanying text, we do not believe that the concept of special relationship extends
as far as Swerdlow does.
284. Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1661; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs
§ 314A (1977). Section 314A indicates that the underlying rationale for liability is the
slowly growing recognition that there should be a "duty to aid or protect in any relation of
dependence or of mutual dependence." The section lists the following examples of "special
relations" that give rise to a duty to aid or protect:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty
to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportuni-
ties for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
Id. In setting forth these examples, the Restatement expresses the caveat that it has no
opinion "as to whether there may not be other relations which impose a similar duty." Id.
285. See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1659-60.
286. See id. at 1653. According to Swerdlow, examples of such traits might include
"possession, use or sale of drugs, sexual or racial harassment, acts of violence, theft,
discrimination, sexual misconduct, willful destruction of property, possession of weapons
in the work place, safety violations, improper disposal of toxic waste, lack of competence,
and falsification of prior credentials." Id. Examples of behavior not requiring notification
would be "mere laziness, tardiness, or absenteeism." Id.
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tive employer's property, employees, customers, or other members of the
public with whom the prospective employer deals should give rise to liability
under the tort of negligent referral.W
With respect to the second type of relationship - that between employ-
ers and employees - Swerdlow argues that this also constitutes a special
relationship that gives rise to a duty to warn prospective employers in appro-
priate cases. 28  Her rationale derives from sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts that impose duties upon employers to control the conduct
of their employees when the employers know or should know that the em-
ployees present a risk of harm. 9
The problem with Swerdlow's master-servant argument is that the vast
majority of employment-reference cases do not involve master-servant
relationships in which an employer has the authority to "exercise reasonable
care so as to control his servant" as called for in Section 317 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Tons. Instead, such cases typically concern past but
severed master-servant situations in which the existence of a special relation-
ship is dubious at best because the employer has no authority whatsoever
over its former employee.
The second commentator who endorses, albeit in a less expansive
fashion, an affirmative duty to disclose is Professor Bradley Saxton. 29°
287. Id. at 1670.
288. Id. at 1662-63.
289. Swerdlow points to § 315 and § 317 of the Restatement. Section 315 states the
principle that "[tihere is no duty to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless... a special relation exists between the actor
and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 315 (1977). Section 317 states:
§ 317. Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from inten-
tionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreason-
able risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant,
and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising
such control.
Id. § 317.
290. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 94-97.
1440
"NO COMMENT" POLICIES: A REFORM PROPOSAL
Saxton concurs with Swerdlow that a special relationship exists both between
employers and prospective employers, and between employers and their past
or current employees, but Saxton appears to assign different significance to
them. Swerdlow emphasizes the relationship between employers and pro-
spective employers, 91 whereas Saxton focuses more on the relationship
between employers and employees. 29
Saxton proposes that a substantially narrower duty be imposed on
employers than Swerdlow does. Whereas Swerdlow would require notifica-
tion about problems such as possession of drugs, lack of competence, or
falsification of credentials,2' Saxton would limit mandatory disclosure to
"information that appears reasonably necessary to avert the risk of physical
injury to the prospective employer, the prospective employer's employees,
or the members of the public with whom the prospective employer's employ-
ees will come in contact. "I Saxton's approach would focus on preventing
291. See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1660-61.
292. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 94. According to Saxton:
The [Tarasoff court] relied on the "special relationship" between psychotherapist
and patient as the basis for imposing on therapists an affirmative duty to warn
third parties. The employer-employee relationship seems closely analogous in
pertinent respects to the psychotherapist-patient relationship; most importantly,
the employer may acquire special knowledge of an individual's dangerous or
criminal tendencies in the course of the employer-employee relationship, just as
a therapist may acquire special knowledge of a patient's dangerous tendencies in
the course of the therapist-patient relationship. In these circumstances, the
"special relationship" between employer and employee could, and I submit
should, be used as the basis for imposing on the employer a duty to warn poten-
tial "thifd-party" victims of the employee's future conduct, just as the "special
relationship" between psychotherapist and patient was used in Tarasoff as the
basis for imposing a duty on psychotherapists toward the identifiable targets of
their patients' violence.
Id. Although we are not unsympathetic to Saxton's argument, we think that he somewhat
reverses the Tarasoff court's rationale. He seems to suggest that because an employer may
acquire special knowledge of an individual's dangerous or criminal tendencies that the
employer, therefore, stands in a special relationship with that individual and has a duty to
warn. Yet, this switches premise and conclusion. As we note, see infra notes 305-10 and
accompanying text, one must have a special relationship with another before a duty to warn
arises. The relationship must exist independently of any special knowledge about another's
dangerous tendencies. Whether employers, as a general matter, have a special relationship
with former employees over whom they exercise no control is an issue yet to be decided in
any conclusive fashion by the courts.
293. See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1653.
294. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 97. Under Saxton's approach, an employer would
"not generally be required under the duty proposed here to warn a prospective new em-
ployer that a former employee dressed badly, used profanity, made bookkeeping errors, had
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violence or other dangerous conduct and would not address other undesirable
traits.
4. Concerns About Imposing an Affirmative Duty of Disclosure
Although we find Swerdlow's and Saxton's proposals intriguing, we see
several aspects that cause concern. Despite their suggestion that courts need
to take only a small step from the principles of the Tarasoff case to the
employment setting,29 we think the distance from that case to their respective
proposals may be greater than Swerdlow and Saxton indicate.
As a starting point, we find it interesting if not significant that although
Tarasoff has gained wide acceptance among courts296 and state legislatures,2I
and has expanded into several nonpsychotherapist settings,29 it has not, as
an abrasive personality, or was generally incompetent." Id. We agree with Saxton that any
duty to be imposed ought to be limited to instances in which there is physical danger.
Indeed, to the extent that we would impose a duty, we would do so in an even narrower
fashion than Saxton - limiting the duty to instances in which an employer has learned on
a confidential basis that an employee imminently plans to assault a readily identifiable victim
or class of victims. See infra notes 303-13 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 2, at 95-96. Saxton argues that the likelihood of
disclosing confidential information is substantially less in the employment relationship than
in the patient-therapist relationship. Id. Accordingly, he suggests that "the arguments for
imposition on employers of a 'duty of disclosure' may in certain respects be even stronger
than the arguments in Tarasoff for imposition on therapists of a 'duty to warn,' at least so
long as the employer's 'duty of disclosure' is properly defined and limited." Id. at 96.
296. See Lake, supra note 277, at 98 (stating that Tarasoff has been "widely accepted
(and rarely rejected) by courts and legislatures in the United States as a foundation for
establishing duties of reasonable care upon psychotherapists to warn, control, and/or protect
potential victims of their patients who have expressed violent intentions"). According to the
analysis in a recent decision by the Missouri Court of Appeals, at least 11 cases have either
adopted Tarasoff or have adopted a rule imposing even broader liability and three cases have
indicated an intention to do so. See Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 308-09 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995). Only one jurisdiction has rejected Tarasoff. See Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.
2d 446, 448-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1658 n.76
and cases cited therein.
297. See Lake, supra note 277, at 98. According to an analysis by the Missouri Court
of Appeals in Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 309, at least 15 state legislatures have statutorily
imposed a duty to warn in situations similar to that in Tarasoff.
298. See, e.g., Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that "when an employer gains information about a serious danger to which a readily
identifiable former employee has been exposed in the course of his employment, the relative
cost or inconvenience of warning him is not substantial, and there is reason to believe that
the warning might be of some benefit to its recipient, the California Supreme Court would
find that a duty to warn exists"); Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1126-
27 (Alaska 1986) (state parole board has special relationship with parolee giving rise to duty
to protect or warn foreseeable victims); Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 317
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far as we can determine, been extended to negligent referral cases. We do
not suggest that such a step is out of the question. Indeed, given the expan-
sive reading of Tarasoff by some courts 99 and the enthusiastic approval of
some commentators,3to we suspect that it is quite possible that one or more
courts will impose liability on a former employer for failing to warn a
prospective employer about the dangerous propensities of a former employee.
Yet we doubt whether any expansion of Tarasoff principles, if it does occur
with respect to employment references, will extend beyond limited"1 and
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (bartender has duty to permit patron to call police or to call police
himself when bartender knows that third person has been injured); Mann v. State, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (state traffic officer owes duty to protect stalled cars
when, after stopping and investigating accident, he leaves without placing protective flares
on freeway and without warning anyone he was leaving when he should have realized that
his actions would place stalled motorists in danger); Eisel v. Board of Educ., 597 A.2d 447,
455 (Md. 1991) (unior high school counselors owe duty to prevent suicides of students and
to warn parents of children's suicidal tendencies); Duvall v. Golding, 362 N.W.2d 275, 279
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (doctor had duty to inform epileptic patient not to drive automobile);
Coath v. Jones, 419 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Pa. 1980) (employer has duty to warn customers
about former employee terminated for dangerous tendencies when employer knows that
employee might attack customers); Taggert v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (Wash. 1992) (en
bane) (parole officers have duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable dangers
engendered by parolees' dangerous propensities).
299. Two cases that push liability to new boundaries are Soldano v. O'Daniels, 190
Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) and Mann v. State, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977). In Soldano, the court imposed a duty to render assistance even in the absence of any
special relationship between the parties. Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 318. In Mann, the
court determined that, although there is generally no special relationship between traffic
officers and stranded motorists, once an officer has chosen to investigate a stranded motorist
and realizes the risks involved in the situation, a special relationship arises, requiring the
officer to protect the citizen. Mann, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
300. See generally Adler, supra note 279; Lake, supra note 277; see also Saxton, supra
note 2, at 91-99; Schwartz, supra note 224, at 701; Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1667-71.
301. As noted above, see supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text, courts in the
United States are moving to narrow tort liability more than they are moving to expand it.
Moreover, although it seems quite likely that the Tarasoff precedent will expand throughout
the states in the context of psychotherapists - and occasionally in other nontherapeutic
settings - one should note that a number of courts have refused the call to be expansive in
following Tarasoff principles. See, e.g., Homer v. Pabst Brewing Co., 806 F.2d 119, 123
(7th Cir. 1986) (employer that maintained medical department to provide palliative care to
its employees did not owe duty of care to persons injured in collision with employee who
lost consciousness when driving home after his shift was completed, as employer did not
volunteer to protect general public from illnesses that might befall its employees); Lindgren
v. Moore, 907 F. Supp. 1183, 1187-89 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (therapist owed no duty to father
of patient who alleged that his daughter falsely accused him of sexual abuse after therapy
with defendant because no special relationship existed between father and daughter that
would give rise to such duty); Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp. 243, 251-53 (D.
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particularly compelling cases"2 - insufficient, in our view, to do much to
solve the employment-reference crisis that our country currently faces.
Our lack of enthusiasm also stems from our misgivings about the
proposition that a job-reference inquiry from a prospective employer to a
former employer should impose a broad duty to warn on the former em-
ployer. Our position here is not an absolutist one. We can imagine situa-
tions in which a duty to warn ought to attach and in which liability ought to
arise for a breach of that duty. For example, we support the proposition that
liability should apply to former employers that provide favorable references
which omit critical information about their employees' dangerous propensi-
ties.303 Our reason is simple - unless the former employers clearly have
Md. 1993) (insurance company had no special relationship and owed no duty to applicant
-to disclose that it had rejected her application because she was infected with HIV virus
despite her ignorance of condition); Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F. Supp. 26, 31 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (company operating Job Corps center owed no duty to victim of attacks by corps
members if it could not foresee plaintiffs would be victims), f'd, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.
1983); Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988) (Tarasoff-type
duty to prevent suicide does not extend to nontherapist counselors and pastor); Anthony v.
State, 374 N.W.2d 662, 669 (Iowa 1985) (parole board had no duty to warn when no threats
were made); VanLuchene v. State, 797 P.2d 932, 936 (Mont. 1990) (prison officials have
no duty to warn general public of release of dangerous criminal whose sentence has
expired); Mangeris v. Gordon, 580 P.2d 481, 483-84 (Nev. 1978) (massage parlor had no
duty to warn taxicab driver about dangerous propensities of one of its patrons); Trull v.
Town of Conway, 669 A.2d 807, 809-10 (N.H. 1995) (when town had no control over
highway, town owed no duty to motorists to warn of icy conditions on highway even though
police officer had requested that dispatcher notify State Department of Transportation of
danger; fact that officer had superior knowledge of hazard created no duty); Rozycki ex reL
Rozycki v. Peley, 489 A.2d 1272, 1277 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (no duty on wife's
part to warn of her husband's dangerous propensities); Rogers v. Department of Parole and
Community Corrections, 464 S.E.2d 330, 332 (S.C. 1995) (parole officials owed no duty
to warn.murder victim when perpetrator was released under furlough program absent
specific threat to harm victim despite evidence that perpetrator's conduct indicated possible
threat to victim).
302. Our review of the case law convinces us that courts are unlikely to extend the duty
to warn beyond instances in which serious physical injury is imminent. Although these
cases are of crucial importance, they clearly represent only a fraction of the information that
should be conveyed from former employers to prospective employers.
303. Sections 323 and 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts impose liability on
those who undertake to render assistance to others, but do so in a manner that increases the
risk of injury either for the person receiving assistance or for third persons injured as a
result of their negligent undertaking. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A
(1977). These sections appear to cover the situation we have in mind because a prospective
employer (and its employees) may be lulled by a misleading reference into believing that an
employee is unlikely to be dangerous. See also Randi W. v. Livingston Union Sch. Dist.,
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 473 (Cal. Ct. App 1995) (student molested by school vice principal
successfully sued prior school district that, despite knowledge of numerous incidents of
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indicated that they are willing to share only positive information, they will
create a situation in which prospective employers will be misled about the
risks of hiring an employee.
We also support the notion that a limited duty to warn should arise in
some factual settings similar to the Tarasoff case, that is, when an employer
has learned on a confidential basis that an employee imminently plans to
assault a readily identifiable victim or class of victims. Although we see a
moral duty to act when safety concerns exist, beyond these narrow circum-
stances we hesitate to impose tort liability for a former employer's refusal to
provide references. 3" In our view, silence in such an instance, although
regrettable, should rarely give rise to detrimental reliance on the part of a
prospective employer and, accordingly, it is hard to see the dependence 0 5 in
such a situation that would warrant considering it a special relationship
giving rise to a duty to warn. That is, if a former employer refuses to
disclose reference information, the prospective employer will not be able to
claim that it was lulled into a false sense of security or detrimentally relied
in some fashion. To the contrary, the prospective employer, if anything,
may be put on guard that the employee's record needs to be investigated.
Moreover, even if the former employer was the only person who knew
of an employee's dangerous tendencies - a situation far less likely to arise
in the employment context than in a confidential therapeutic relationship -
that fact, standing alone, generally is insufficient to establish a special
relationship of the type necessary to impose a duty to warn.3" Merely
because one has unique knowledge of danger to others, one does not stand
sexual misconduct, gave vice principal favorable job reference when he applied for job in
district in which student attended school).
304. We note in passing that this circumstance would rarely arise with respect to
employment references because an employer would usually have little knowledge about an
employee's intention to assault someone at the site of a prospective employer.
305. According to Swerdlow, it is the "dependence" of the prospective employer on the
former employer that gives rise to the special relationship between the parties. See
Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1661.
306. We acknowledge that some courts have been creative in finding the existence of
a special relationship. See, e.g., Mann v. State, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(special relationship existed between state traffic officer and stalled motorists when officer,
after stopping and investigating stalled cars, left after tow truck arrived without advising
anyone he was leaving); Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976) (special
relationship existed between two friends on social venture, giving rise to duty on part of one
friend tb rescue other); Coath v. Jones, 419 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)
(employer in special relationship with customers such that employer had duty to warn
customers that he had discharged employee with dangerous propensities). Sporadic expan-
sions of the concept of special relationship such as these may continue but, in our view, are
not likely to become mainstream holdings.
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in a special relationship to others, and one generally assumes no duty to
act."° Despite scattered calls to impose a duty to assist whenever danger is
reasonably foreseeable even in the absence of a special relationship between
the parties, courts have generally resisted such entreaties. If, as Swerdlow
appears to argue, 08 knowledge of a past employee's dangerous propensities
is sufficient to establish a special relationship, then anyone, including a
stranger, who becomes aware of danger would have a duty to inform persons
at risk of the danger. Among the examples that come to mind of individuals
who would have a duty to warn under the principles of Swerdlow's
approach3°9 are an airline passenger who inadvertently learns the assault plans
of the person seated next to her during a flight, a customer in a bar who
overhears the assault plans of the inebriated person on a nearby stool,
patients in a group therapy session who learn of the assault plans of a fellow
patient, and a college student whose roommate confides that he plans to
assault another student. The law has not moved, and seems unlikely to
move, to impose liability in these situations.310 Although the moral tug in
these situations is powerful, the critical issue is whether society is prepared
to impose tort damages, perhaps in the hundreds of thousands (or even
307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF7 TORTS § 314 (1977) ("The fact that the actor
realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protec-
tion does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."); Id. § 315 (1977)
(stating that absent special relationship, one generally has no duty to control conduct of third
person so as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another); see also Doe v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 860 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Md. 1993) (finding that insurance
company had no duty to disclose to applicant that she had tested HIV-positive when she
applied for life insurance even though she clearly did not realize that she was infected);
Fahnestock & Co. v. Castelazo, 741 F. Supp. 72, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that absent
special relationship, there is no general duty to warn others of foreseeable risk of harm even
if one has knowledge of risk that exists); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft,
564 A.2d 1244, 1248 (Pa. 1989) (holding that before person can be subject to liability
for failing to act in given situation, person must have duty to act; mere knowledge of
dangerous situation, even by one with ability to intervene, is not sufficient to create duty to
act); Neil J. Squillante, Comment, Expanding the Potential Tort Liability of Physicians: A
Legal Portrait of "Nontraditional Patients" and Proposals for Change, 40.UCLA L. REv.
1617, 1670 (1993) (challenging view that Tarasoff establishes precedent that foreseeability
of harm, standing alone, creates special relationship sufficient to establish duty under tort
law).
308. -See Swerdlow, supra note 2, at 1660-61.
309. We do not claim that Swerdlow would want to impose liability in these situations.
What we argue is that the principles she espouses to support liability in employ-
ment-reference settings are so inclusive that they sweep in cases like those in our examples.
310. Scenarios such as these do happen. See, e.g., Eleena De Lisser, Seatmates May
Share Their Deepest Secrets or Their Bologna, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1996, at Al; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-315 (1977).
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millions) of dollars, on citizens - particularly those who are uninvolved and
who passively or inadvertently acquire information about another's danger-
ousness - for failing to act. The prospect of substantial damages, among
other reasons, gives us pause when it comes to imposing a duty to warn in
the employment-reference context. Those most likely to run afoul of the
duty will be small companies without knowledge of the duty and, perhaps,
without insurance to cover damages. If employers are to have a general duty
to warn of a former employee's dangerous propensities - and we'remain
open but unconvinced on the point - we prefer that the duty be to alert
public authorities about the danger, if it is sufficiently grave, clear, and
imminent, rather than to notify prospective employers. 311  In making this
point, we hasten once again to note that we share the concern about the
choking of reference information that has occurred in recent years, and we
strongly second the call for remedial measures to be taken to rectify the
situation. However, we prefer an approach that provides positive incentives
to employers," 2 rather than the threat of damages, to motivate employers to
abandon their current no comment stance when queried about references." 3
B. Reforming the Qualified Privilege in Defamation and Related Laws
Because references involve the communication of either oral or written
information, defamation law almost always plays a role in any challenge to
a former employer's negative reference. For that reason, virtually all of the
311. As anyone who has ever read of the Kitty Genovese case in New York (or who
has read of other cases in which neighbors stood by without calling police while a terrible
crime was committed) knows, there is no such duty generally.
312. We note that Professor Saxton shares our sense that employers should not be called
to return to providing references more freely without the assurance that beefed-up protec-
tions will be provided them. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 98 (stating belief that "any
attempt to enact or adopt 'duty of disclosure' proposed [in his article] must ensure that an
employer is adequately protected from liability to a former employee if the employer is
compelled by the duty to disclose admonitory information that the employer may not be able
to support with hard evidence"). Saxton's approach is to establish a strong qualified
privilege for defamation lawsuits and, in certain instances, provide for recovery of costs and
attorney fees by employer-defendants. Id. at 98-112.
313. See, e.g., McMorris, supra note 11 (noting that in states where new laws provide
employers greater protection to provide references, although they do not require disclosure,
employment lawyers are starting to advise their clients to disclose information about former
employees' violent behavior). If the law were modified as we suggest, see infra note 412
and accompanying text, we think it would substantially lessen the frequency of no reference
policies without the need for imposing an affirmative duty upon employers to disclose.
However, if these policies remain widespread despite added legal protections for employers
to warn about former employees, then we would be more enthusiastic about expanding the
duty to warn.
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reform efforts that have been advanced involve some modification of defama-
tion law - typically an expansion or a clarification of the qualified privilege
under applicable state law. 4 Although we see a great deal that is positive
in the enactment of these statutes, we dislike some of the features commonly
found in them,31 5 and we see gaps in them that we think should be filled. 316
1. The Complexity and Confusion of Modern Defamation Law
As a starting point, we share the frustration of those commentators who
decry the current complexity and confusion in modem defamation law. 7
314. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text. One of the aggravating features
of analyzing the law on qualified privilege is that there is precious little uniformity in
applying the privilege. See Posey, supra note 2, at 471 (noting that courts have adopted
"widely divergent interpretations of common-law qualified privilege. At worst, the privilege
extends only to true statements or is defeated by mere negligence. At best, the privilege
extends a protection to employers that is pierced only by actual malice.").
315. See infra notes 331-52 and accompanying text.
316. See infra notes 331-52 and accompanying text.
317. Professor Robert Ackerman voiced a number of concerns in a 1994 law review
article:
The law of defamation is in disarray. It is confusing. It is unclear. Most
critically, it fails to serve its most important objectives: providing an adequate
remedy for reputational harm while allowing sufficient protection for speech. The
chaotic nature of defamation law is primarily due to the fact that, at present,
defamation law involves a juxtaposition of two bodies of law: (1) the archaic state
common law of libel and slander, a system arising from medieval roots, and (2)
First Amendment jurisprudence, as developed by courts following the United
States Supreme Court's landmark New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision in
1964 .... As a result, the law of defamation resembles a creature fashioned by
committee, or worse yet, one fashioned by several independent committees ....
Ackerman, supra note 226, at 293; see also David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for
Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REv. 847, 853 (1986) (arguing that "root of the
present libel crisis lies in the fact that reputation can be injured by words, but the common
law offers redress only in the form of money damages"); Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law
and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 232-33
(1985) (reviewing two-year study of libel litigation and concluding that "law of libel seems
to have disturbingly little relationship to the real actions and objectives of the parties, that
what is decided in litigation may be substantially irrelevant to the actual dispute, and that
the legal rules are encouraging the very conduct sought to be discouraged, and discouraging
the conduct sought to be encouraged"); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alterna-
tive to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. Rv. 809, 810 (1986) (arguing that current libel law
"has developed into a high-stakes game that serves the purposes of neither the parties nor
the public"); Paul Gaffney, A First Amendment Analysis of the Annenberg Libel Reform
Proposal, 1990 U. CI. LEGAL F. 601, 601 (arguing that Supreme Court's rulings have
"unwittingly turned libel law into a giant lottery system .... and may have made defama-
tion suits complex beyond the grasp of the typical jury").
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Aside from the fact that the law is complex and unclear, defamation operates
on misguided assumptions about why plaintiffs bring defamation lawsuits and
what remedy plaintiffs truly desire. 18 Moreover, although defamation
actions are the lawsuit of choice for employees who have received negative
job references,1 9 such actions serve those aggrieved poorly because most
plaintiffs lose3  and most lawsuits get derailed on issues such as privilege or
fault32' rather than addressing the critical question of whether or not the
allegations in the reference were true.3z This means that most defamation
suits now focus not on truth or falsity, but on the purity or reasonableness
of the defendant's thoughts at the time of making the allegedly defamatory
statements.323 As one commentator stated, "[a]s a practical matter, the truth
or falsity of the challenged statement is no longer pertinent to the libel
action."324 Although serving the purpose of promoting freedom of expres-
318. See Bezanson, supra note 317, at 227, 232-33 ("Money rarely seems to be the
reason for suing. Most plaintiffs sue to correct the record and to get even."); Wissler, supra
note 227, at 473 (noting that according to study by Iowa Libel Research 'Group, most
plaintiffs indicate that money damages are of little interest; rather, retraction or vindication
are what plaintiffs really seek).
319. See Martha Middleton, Employers Face Upsurge in Suits over Defamation, NAT'L
L.J., May 4, 1987, at 1 (noting that employer defamation actions may account for up to one-
third of all defamation actions).
320. See Bezanson, supra note 317, at 228 (noting two-year study at University of Iowa
found that "few libel plaintiffs win" and that in case of lawsuits against media, less than 10%
of plaintiffs win).
321. Even if a plaintiff can establish the falsity and defamatory harm of a libel defen-
dant's statement, the plaintiff cannot recover damages absent a showing of fault. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974). Moreover, depending on who the
defendant is (e.g., a public figure) or applicable state law, the plaintiff may have to overcome
a legal privilege available to the defendant that requires the plaintiff to prove intentional or
reckless wrongdoing rather than mere negligence. According to one study, nearly 90% of
libel suits are disposed of on grounds that the plaintiff failed to show the defendant's negli-
gence or malice, rather than whether the defendant's statements were false. See Barrett,
supra note 317, at 855 (noting that seven out of eight libel suits are now decided on constitu-
tional privilege grounds); John Soloski, The Study and the Libel Plaintiff. Who Sues for
Libel?, 71 IowA L. REv. 217, 218 (1985).
322. See Bezanson, supra note 317, at 230 ("As a practical matter, the truth or falsity
of the challenged statement is no longer pertinent to the libel action. Liability, when found,
is as often rested on a finding of abuse of privilege .... ").
323. See Barrett, supra note 317, at 855 (noting that cases such as New York Times and
Gertz, by requiring plaintiffs to prove fault, have shifted focus of libel suits away from
question of falsehood and to constitutionally mandated question of defendant's state of mind);
Gaffhey, supra note 317, at 606 (noting that "most critics agree that libel suits now center, not
on the veracity of the statement, but the defendant's state of mind when it was made").
324. See Bezanson, supra note 317, at 230; see also Ackerman, supra note 226, at 301
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sion, especially for the media,3" the new safeguards effectively guarantee
that plaintiffs who have been defamed and who have suffered as a result will
be without redress unless they can prove that the defendant acted negligently
or with malice.326
2. Qualified Privilege and Employment References
Just as defamation lawsuits are the remedy of choice for aggrieved
employees, qualified privilege is the first line of defense for sued employ-
ers.327 Although truth remains a defense to defamation claims, 3 employers
(or rather their attorneys) rarely choose to defend on that basis alone. The
problem with such a defense is that the employer may have given a job
reference that cannot easily be documented, consists mainly of unverifiable
opinion, or contains some falsehoods of which the employer is unaware.
Moreover, even if the employer feels confident that it can prove the allega-
tions in a job reference, the employer may not want to rely on the unpredict-
ability of a jury, which may be extremely sympathetic to a worker denied
employment because of the employer's negative reference. Accordingly,
employers, almost without fail, will exhaust all opportunities to have the case
decided on the basis of a qualified privilege rather than to have the case
decided on truth or falsity.
329
As previously discussed, employers that turn to qualified privilege find
a confused and confusing body of law awaiting them. 3 1 Of course, such a
confused state buttresses the advice of those lawyers who advise their clients
to adopt no comment policies.
(arguing that "[i]ssues of truth or falsity, fairness, and redress for injury are lost in the
gamesmanship that dominates this tort like no other").
325. See Wissler, supra note 227, at 471 (noting that "constitutional privileges have
succeeded in protecting media defendants from large money judgments").
326. Id. at 473. Whether the plaintiff will have to prove negligence or malice will vary
according to the identity of the defendant and the law of the forum state.
327. See supra notes 126-51 and accompanying text.
328. See IY=ON ET AL., supra note 63, § 116, at 839-42; see also supra notes 101-04
and accompanying text.
329. See Ackerman, supra note 226, at 301 (noting that most cases do not address
issues of truth or falsity, but revolve around whether or not defendant has met requirements
either of constitutional or qualified privilege).
330. See supra notes 126-51, 317-26, and accompanying text; see also Posey, supra
note 2, at 483-87 ("The difficulty arises in determining from case law the scope of an
employer's qualified privilege. Courts differ widely on what parties share the requisite
interests and duties to invoke the privilege and on what is required of the plaintiff to defeat
the privilege.").
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3. State Legislative Initiatives to Expand Employer Protections
As noted previously, a number of state legislatures in recent years have
sought to assist employers by expanding the qualified privilege in defamation
and related lawsuits.33 ' Although their statutory language often uses termi-
nology most relevant to defamation actions, states have not limited the scope
of their reforms to defamation lawsuits. Accordingly, these reforms should
extend to causes of action such as negligence, tortious interference with
prospective employment, blacklisting, and the like. Regrettably, these
approaches have not solved the problem. Although we applaud the general
stiffening of employer defenses, we see problems with a number of the
approaches the states have adopted.
First, the dramatic variations in current state law reform efforts332 guar-
antee that employers with multistate operations or employers that receive out-
of-state job-reference inquiries will develop policies geared to the law of the
least protective states or will simply not provide references. 33 This situation,
to say the least, produces suboptimal outcomes and cries out for national
uniformity, that is, federal legislation. 3
Second, despite the states' good intentions, a number of the standards
that states have adopted present such logical inconsistencies and read so
poorly that employers that hoped for clearer and stronger protections to
enable them to share employee-reference information surely will be disap-
pointed.335 At the extreme, these statutes appear to narrow and to undermine
331. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
332. See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text. The "privilege" or "immunity"
statutes are not uniform. They run the gamut from states that provide broad protection for
employer references (e.g., Indiana provides immunity for references unless the plaintiff can
prove they were "known to be false at the time the disclosure was made," see IND. CODE
ANN. § 22-5-3-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996)) to states that appear, perhaps unwittingly, to
have narrowed the existing privilege (e.g., Colorado and Tennessee now protect only
"truthful, fair and unbiased" information, see infra note 335 and accompanying text).
333. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 77 (noting that "[o]ne result of the multiplicity of
standards that may potentially determine an employer's liability for employment references
is that employers and their counsel are encouraged to favor conservative, 'no comment'
reference strategies").
334. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforning?, 140 U. PA. L. RPv. 487,
553 (1991) ("Libel law is a field that cries out for some uniformity. Today intrastate speech
is even rarer than intrastate commerce. Defamers are rarely subject to one state's law, and
unless they are, they must tailor their speech to the least protective state law to which they
may be subject."), cited in Ackerman, supra note 226, at 302 n.56; see also Posey, supra
note 2, at 493-94 (arguing that, at minimum, courts should seek to discover and consider
other jurisdictions' approaches).
335. Colorado and Tennessee seem tied for the most poorly drafted statutes. We cite
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existing legal protections unwittingly.336
Third, few states do a good job of defining two critical terms: "good
faith" and "malice." This failure is particularly troubling because many
statutes require one to understand malice in order to determine the meaning
of good faith. For example, a number of statutes provide that disclosures
about workers by past or current employers to prospective employers will
receive immunity from civil liability except for those that lack good faith.
Employers cannot demonstrate good faith if they acted with malice.337
Regrettably, the legislatures rarely indicate how to interpret these terms. For
example, is the term "good faith" to be read subjectively, that is, honestly
believed but unreasonable falsehoods are protected, or objectively, that is,
only honestly believed falsehoods with some reasonable basis are pro-
tected?338 Few states spell out their approach'on this point.
Tennessee's statute, which is quite similar to Colorado's:
50-1-105 Providing information to prospective employers - Good Faith
Any employer that, upon request by a prospective employer or a current or
former employee, provides truthful, fair and unbiased information about a current
or former employee's job performance is presumed to be acting in good faith and
is granted a qualified immunity for the disclosure and the consequences of the
disclosure. The presumption of good faith is rebuttable upon a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed was:
(1) Knowingly false;
(2) Deliberately misleading;
(3) Disclosed for a malicious purpose;
(4) Disclosed in reckless disregard for its falsity or defamatory nature; or
(5) Violative of the current or former employee's civil rights pursuant to current'
employment discrimination laws.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996). Aside from the fact that a number of the
terms need elaboration in order to be understood, the statute is internally inconsistent. As
currently drafted, only information that is "truthful, fair and unbiased" qualifies for the
statutory immunity. Yet if this information and only this information qualifies, why would
there be a need for a presumption of good faith? "IT]ruthful, fair and unbiased" informa-
tion, by definition, is not false, misleading, malicious, or recklessly disclosed. Clearly,
someone goofed in drafting this statute. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114 (West
1986 & Supp. 1996) (presenting similar problems).
336. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-114 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996).
337. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 40, § 61 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996) (stating that
presumption of "good faith" is rebutted if employer that provided job reference "acted with
malice").
338. Most courts appear to follow the subjective test in interpreting state law. See
Horkan, supra note 2, at 523 (noting that most courts that have ruled on meaning of term
define it as "a subjectively honest, though possibly unreasonable, belief that the information
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A similar problem arises with respect to the term "malice." Although
the Supreme Court adopted a reasonably clear definition of this term in its
landmark New York Times decision, 339 a number of states use the term in a
different sense.31 For example, Oklahoma provides that one can rebut the
presumption that an employment reference was made in good faith upon a
showing that the information "was false and the employer providing the
information had knowledge of its falsity or acted with malice or reckless
disregard for the truth. '"" This statute incorporates the New York Times
"actual malice" standard, but adds an additional element - that of "malice."
In our view, adding this element not only creates confusion but is also
unnecessary.3 2 That is, so long as an employer discloses information in
response to the request of a prospective employer in an appropriate
manner - i.e., the employer discloses only relevant information in response
to requests by prospective employers - the fact that the employer bears the
employee some ill will should not preclude the employer from disclosing
it.43
is necessary").
339. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (stating that
"actual malice" exists with respect to statement if it is made "with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
340. See John J. Watkins & Charles W. Schwartz, Gertz and the Common Law of
Defamation: Of Fault, Nonmedia Defendants, and Conditional Privileges, 15 TEX. TECH L.
REv. 823, 871 (noting that some courts "hold that a showing of ill will or spite is sufficient
to overcome a conditional privilege, while others require that the plaintiff demonstrate
'constitutional' malice, that is, knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth as used
in New York Times").
341. OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 40, § 61 (Vest 1986 & Supp. 1996).
342. Prosser and Keeton would abolish the term in the context of qualified privilege.
See KEaTON ET AL., supra note 63, § 115, at 833-34 (calling for "discarding" of malice "as
a meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term"); see also supra notes 137-50 and accompany-
ing text.
343. On this point, we find ourselves convinced by Professor Saxton's arguments that
ill will should not necessarily defeat a qualified privilege claim. Saxton argues that because
employers will often feel resentment or anger at the past misbehavior of employees, the
employers will always be vulnerable to the charge that they acted with improper motives.
According to Saxton:
The result is to greatly encourage litigation over reference disputes, with the
plaintiff and the defendant respectively striving to convince the factfinder that the
defendant's motives were primarily "malicious" or primarily "proper." This
tendency of the "malice" and "improper purpose" tests to encourage litigation
over reference disputes is a compelling reason why these standards should be
discarded, at least if other more clearly-defined standards adequately serve the
interests served by the "malice" and "improper purpose" standards.
Saxton, supra note 2, at 82.
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4. Critical Elements in Crafting an Appropriate Qualified Privilege
At the outset, we note that although we have discussed qualified
privilege in the context of defamation, we intend our reform proposals to
extend to other causes of action that could be brought against an employer
by a former or current employee with respect to a job reference.' At a
minimum, we would include causes of action such as blacklisting, tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage, negligence, violating
service-letter statutes, and misrepresentation. For a variety of reasons, we
would not interfere with current laws relating to racial or sexual discrimina-
tion.' Before proposing a substantive standard, we shall address four pre-
liminary issues.
The first issue presents a particular challenge to those seeking an
appropriate standard for qualified privilege in employee references -
distinguishing fact from opinion. In the typical employment-reference
inquiry, the prospective employer seeks the former employer's overall
assessment of an employee rather than the details of any specific aspect of
the employee's job performance." Although courts generally indicate that
expressions of pure opinion are not actionable,347 such expressions become
so when undisclosed defamatory facts form the basis of the opinion.' The
344. We note in passing that Professor Saxton extends his proposal for reforming qualified
privilege to tort theories of "defamation, tortious interference with prospective contractual
relation, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage." Id. at 109.
345. Besides, our statutory recommendations were enacted at a state level, federal laws
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994), that govern
racial and sexual discrimination would preempt any state law that purported to modify existing
federal standards. If our recommendations were enacted at the federal level, we would still
not seek to change existing federal antidiscrimination legislation because (1) we favor strong,
comprehensive antidiscrimination laws and (2) political opposition to any weakening of the
civil rights laws undoubtedly would spell the death of the proposal.
346. See Posey, supra note 2, at 479 (noting that in "employment context, the prospective
employer solicits an opinion - an overall perception of an individual as. a person and an
employee"); see also supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
347. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); see also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of their ideas."); Gross v.
New York Times Co., 180 A.D.2d 308, 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that statement
of pure opinion neither based nor impliedly based on undisclosed facts nonactionable). But
see Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990) (stating that even opinions can
be defamatory if they reasonably imply false assertion of fact); see also supra notes 76-85 and
accompanying text.
348. Id. Conversely, when an opinion derives from truthful facts or from facts not
contested, it will not be actionable. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 113A, at 814.
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problem for employers arises when they give broad characterizations such
as "uncooperative," "bad attitude," "unreliable," "lazy," "immature," "hot-
headed," or the like. Because a broad characterization typically derives
from a number of observations - some easily remembered and others
perhaps not - they present substantial problems of proof if considered to
be fact rather than opinion.' 9 In all likelihood, such characterizations
would be treated as fact by the courts . Therefore, notwithstanding their
extreme usefulness to prospective employers, broad characterizations are
likely to be avoided by employers in job references unless employers are
given substantive legal protection." 1 We would protect broad characteriza-
tions by treating them as nonactionable opinion to the extent that they do
not include specific factual references. If such characterizations include
factual predicates, we would permit an aggrieved employee to challenge the
underlying allegations and to seek to prove the corresponding inaccuracy
of the broad characterization."
The second issue relates to the burden of proof that should apply to
actions involving a qualified privilege - that is, should the law require that
a plaintiff meet a higher standard than preponderance of the evidence in
order to prevail in a challenge to a negative job reference? Although recent
state reform efforts appear inconsistent on this point,353 some legislatures
have required that a plaintiff prove a claim through clear and convincing
evidence rather than through the more traditional preponderance of the
349. That is, rather than having to produce evidence of a single incident, the employer
would have to muster evidence of a number of incidents. In many cases, an employer might
not even remember all of the incidents that gave rise to a judgment about an employee, but
would be quite clear that, in sum, they gave rise to a quite accurate assessment of the
employee.
350. Because the terms all have some arguable verifiability by objective proof, they
likely would be considered fact. See Posey, supra note 2, at 478 n.57 (indicating assess-
ment that courts have adopted per se rule that employers' statements are fact).
351. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 250, at 34-35 (advising employers that give job
references to discuss only verifiable facts, not opinion).
352. If, for example, a former employer gave a reference in which it stated that "Tom
is a lazy worker," we would treat that statement as nonactionable opinion. If, on the other
hand, the employer stated, "Tom is a lazy worker because he missed work twice last year
to go fishing," we would permit Tom to try to prove that he did not miss work to go
fishing.
353. For example, the following states permit the presumption of good faith in provid-
ing employee references to be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence: Alaska,
Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. See supra note 209 and
accompanying text. The following states require clear and convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption of good faith: Florida, Maine, and Utah. See supra note 210 and accompa-
nying text.
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evidence test. 4 The impetus for invoking this higher standard likely stems
from Supreme Court holdings in cases such as New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan35 and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States356 that im-
pose higher burdens of proof on plaintiffs when constitutional privileges
apply. Legislation known as the "Uniform Defamation Act"3' recently
proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to address defamation law reform also calls for a higher burden of
proof in defamation actions."' Although nothing in current defamation law
requires a clear and convincing evidence standard," 9 we recommend this
higher standard to signal society's view that liability ought to attach in
employment-reference cases only in compelling circumstances."
354. Defining the boundaries that separate the various burdens of proof is a particularly
challenging endeavor. Daniloff distinguishes between the clear and convincing evidence and
preponderance of the evidence tests in the context of employment references as follows:
[The c]lear and convincing evidence test would increase the plaintiffs burden of
proof beyond the current preponderance of the evidence requirement. Clear and
convincing evidence is defined as "clear, explicit and unequivocal" or as "suffi-
ciently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."
The distinction between the two standards has been summarized as follows:
"preponderance calls for probability, while clear and convincing proof demands
high probability." Thus, evidence that the employer acted unreasonably would
be necessary to establish liability.
See Daniloff, supra note 2, at 705-06 (citation omitted). Our own unscientific rule of thumb
is that if preponderance of the evidence calls for at least 51% of the credible evidence and
if beyond a reasonable doubt demands over 95%, then clear and convincing evidence falls
somewhere in between. To say the least, determining that a burden of proof has been met
is not rocket science.
355. 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (stating that actual malice must be shown with
"convincing clarity").
356. 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (noting that issues of constitutional fact, such as actual
malice, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
357. See generally Ackerman, supra note 226 (discussing proposed Uniform Defamation
Act and its successor, Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act).
358. See id. at 304-05. The Uniform Defamation Act called for clear and convincing
evidence with respect to matters pertaining to constitutional privilege and preponderance of
the evidence with respect to other questions of fact. This has drawn criticism for being
difficult for juries to understand and apply. Id.
359. Because employment references typically involve private litigants who are not
public figures, it is highly unlikely that the constitutional privilege will apply. Accordingly,
nothing in the various Supreme Court rulings demands a burden of proof higher than
preponderance of the evidence.
360. We could easily live with a preponderance of the evidence test. Our main concern
is that a uniform approach be adopted, which is why we call for federal legislation.
Moreover, in a declaratory judgment setting in which damages are not at issue, we see no
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The third issue relating to qualified privilege arises with respect to who
initiates the communication regarding a job reference. If an employer gives
job-reference information regarding a past or current employee only to
those who request it and never acts as a volunteer, the employer substan-
tially reduces the likelihood that it will be accused of excessive publication
of defamatory materials. 6'
Offering a bright line rule that extends the qualified privilege only to
those that provide employee references in response to inquiries from
prospective employers is a debatable proposition because one can posit
instances in which volunteering information to a prospective employer that
has not requested a job reference would seem to be appropriate. For
example, Professor Saxton challenges the usefulness of a bright line test in
this context by suggesting a hypothetical in which an employer that runs a
daycare center terminates an employee on the ground that the employee
exercised poor judgment in supervising children such that several sustained
injuries. In Saxton's hypothetical, the employer, although certain that the
employee did a poor job, realizes that a reasonable factfinder might dis-
agree with its assessment of the employee. Subsequently, the employer
learns that another daycare center is about to hire the employee. In this
circumstance - not surprisingly given his expansive notion of duty -
Saxton would statutorily provide the former employer a qualified privilege
to notify the prospective employer about its views on the former
employee.362 Although we are sympathetic to Saxton's argument, we would
not extend the statutory qualified privilege that we propose to cover this
situation. Our proposal seeks to establish a safe harbor for those that fit
\within our guidelines, and we prefer to keep them as simple and clear as
possible. Nothing in our proposal, however, would invalidate any state's
common-law privilege - which would likely protect the employer in this
case. Our hesitation in adopting as expansive an approach as Saxton's
stems from our concern that providing a qualified privilege to everyone
who "volunteers" job references would protect too many unfair negative job
reason to impose a clear and convincing evidence test.
361. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, an important factor in deter-
mining whether a qualified privilege should apply to a situation is whether the "publication
is made in response to a request rather than volunteered." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 595(2)(a) (1977). On the other hand, employers that volunteer negative informa-
don about former employees place themselves in a position to lose their qualified privilege.
See, e.g., Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that singer Diana Ross
did not enjoy qualified privilege to distribute unsolicited letter impugning integrity of former
employee).
362. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 87-88.
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references. Accordingly, on balance, we think that a simple and clear
bright line approach is preferable to a more open-ended, complex test. Any
gains in protecting reference-volunteering employers would be more than
offset by confusion arising from added complexity.
Finally, we turn to what the substantive standard should be to protect
employers that give job references. Because we prefer simplicity whenever
possible, we reject the approach that many states have adopted of providing
a presumption of good faith or reasonable belief that the plaintiff must
overcome in order to establish liability. Presumptions such as these strike
us as unnecessary and distracting so long as the actual substantive standard
and burden of proof are set forth directly. In recommending a standard, we
wish to state our assumption about the result we hope the standard will
produce. In the case of employment references, our goal is to expand the
protection available to employers when they give job references about past
or current employees. As noted above,363 we are acutely aware that doing
so may create opportunities for vindictive, dishonest employers to escape
liability when providing employee references.3 4 However, we believe that
our proposals minimize the harm to employees to the greatest extent possi-
ble and add protections for workers not previously available.3"
5. Qualified Privilege: A Recommended Approach
We propose that courts adopt the "actual malice" definition in New
York Times.3" Set forth as a substantive rule, our proposal is as follows:
An employer that discloses information about the job performance
of an employee or former employee at the request of a prospective
employer (or at the request of the employee or former employee) shall
not be civilly liable for any harm caused by such disclosure unless the
employee or former employee demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that:
363. See supra notes 254-5.8 and accompanying text.
364. We note in passing that every other proposal that we have seen that adds
protections for employers when they provide job references also creates the opportunity for
expanded mischief on the part of "bad" employers. Regrettably, few reforms are cost free.
365. We believe that our proposal to create an administrative declaratory judgment
process adds a quick, affordable method of vindicating employee rights. See infra notes
398-411 and accompanying text.
366. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see also supra
notes 113-51 and accompanying text. We see no reason, however, to include the words
"actual malice" in our proposal. We suspect that they carry the likelihood of confusion in
the context of our proposal since most ordinary citizens may not equate a "reckless disregard
of the truth" with malice.
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(1) the information disclosed was false and defamatory,
(2) the information disclosed was acted upon by the prospective
employer in a manner that caused harm to the employee or former
employee, and
(3) the employer knew the information was false or acted with
reckless disregard of the information's truth or falsity.
We propose adoption of this approach because we believe that courts are
knowledgeable about and supportive of the New York Times standard, and
because we think juries will have little difficulty with the concepts contained
in the rule. We grant that much of the litigation surrounding this test
focuses not on truth or falsity, 367 but on what the defendant knew at the
time of giving the reference. Moreover, this test contemplates that mistakes
and falsehoods will be committed and protects all but the most egregious.
In short, this test is a tough and often insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs.
The tradeoff, we believe, will be an increased flow of critical information
producing a safer, more efficient workplace.368
C. Contractual Waivers of Liability: Express and Implied
Whether or not qualified privilege law is reformed as we suggest,
employers might also consider whether they wish to enter into contractual
agreements with their employees regarding tort liability for employment
references." 9 Although it is theoretically possible for employees to seek
agreements in which employers reduce their rights to give references,37 we
suspect that the vast majority of contractual arrangements in this context
will be those sought by employers concerned about being sued. Employers
can seek waiver-of-liability agreements in at least three circumstances:
(1) when they hire an employee; (2) when a former or current employee
requests a job reference; or (3) when a prospective employer insists that an
367. See supra notes 319-24 and accompanying text.
368. Although litigation through courts becomes more difficult for plaintiffs, we provide
an alternative approach through administrative alternative dispute resolution procedures that,
we believe, more than compensates for this. See infra notes 398-411 and accompanying
text.
369. For a discussion of the law on contractual waivers of liability for employment
references, see, for example, Acoff, supra note 2, at 759-60; Saxton, supra note 2, at 62-
63; see also supra notes 106-08 (discussing consent as defamation defense). See generally
Horkan, supra note 2.
370. See Horkan, supra note 2, at 526 (noting that "if employees place a particularly
high value on reputation, they may be willing to pay for more protection than their state's
law provides"). We presume that the most likely approach adopted by employees would be
to ask for a waiver of the employer's qualified or constitutional privilege.
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employee waive tort claims against his or her former employer as a condition
of being considered for employment (and as an inducement for the former
employer to give a candid assessment of the employee).
Absent express agreement, employers can sometimes argue that former
or current employees have given implicit waivers of liability when the
employees ask for references knowing that the references are likely to be
negative. 371 In such a case, if employers give a negative reference, courts
have ruled that the employee should not be able to sue - the employee
should not have requested the reference in the first place. 3' Arguing that a
former employee has implicitly consented to be defamed, however, is a high
risk approach for employers to take and has been strongly criticized."
Employers must approach contractual waivers cautiously. Although
some courts uphold such clauses on the theory that employees can freely
enter into such agreements,374 other courts reject them on the theory that an
employer cannot absolve itself of liability for intentional torts.375 Courts and
commentators have expressed misgivings about their enforceability,376 thereby
giving rise to substantial hesitation on the part of employers to enter into
such agreements.37
We can see that employers in states with strong employee protections
and limited qualified privileges might turn to contractual waivers in the
absence of any other immediate approach that would insulate them from
liability, but we generally do not favor such waivers. Not only are such
waivers uncertain in guaranteeing protection, but they also create an appear-
ance of employer overreaching - at least to the extent that an employer
371. See id. at 528-30 and cases cited therein. Some courts have invoked the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d, illus. 2 (1977), which states that when the
plaintiff has reason to know that a publication will likely be defamatory, consent to such
a publication is a complete defense to any resulting claim.
372. See Horkan, supra note 2, at 528-30.
373. See id. at 528. Horkan argues that employees do not truly consent when their
only choice is to agree to a negative job reference or to lose any opportunity for con-
sideration for the job. Id. In response, one might argue that employees can consent to
such an agreement even though they might not like the unpalatable choices presented to
them.
374. See, e.g., Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. App. 1992).
375. See, e.g., Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
376. See Horkan, supra note 2, at 535 ("[D]isagreement among courts and commenta-
tors creates a great deal of uncertainty about the enforceability of contractual modifications
of the qualified privilege. Consequently, parties to an employment contract may be
hesitant to include such a clause, because its enforcement is doubtful.").
377. See id.
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seeks exoneration even for blatant or malicious lies.378 To the extent that
employers seek a qualified privilege that limits liability to instances of actual
malice, we vastly prefer a statutory approach that provides protection for all
employers, not just those wealthy enough to afford counsel to draft exculpa-
tory clauses. We also prefer a statutory approach because we believe this
more public route offers a greater opportunity for employee rights to be pro-
tected.
D. Attorney Fees: A Limited Proposal to Make the Loser Pay
Under the legal system in the United States litigants typically must pay
for the legal fees they incur irrespective of the outcome of the lawsuit. This
so-called American Rule dates back to colonial times and often is seen as a
fundamental approach of our jurisprudence.379 In contrast, most of the rest
of the world's common-law systems follow the so-called English Rule, in
which the losing party must pay for the winner's attorney fees.380 The trade-
offs between the two systems are stark. Under the English Rule, litigants
who win a lawsuit are made substantially whole, that is, they recover the
substantial attorney fees that must be paid in pursuing or defending a lawsuit.
On the other hand, the knowledge that such fees must be paid surely discour-
ages all but the most wealthy or risk-taking of parties and creates almost
irresistible pressures on the parties to settle.38" ' In contrast, under the Ameri-
can Rule, even impoverished litigants, especially those with attorneys who
take cases on a contingent fee basis,3" find ready access to the courts even
on novel and untested legal theories. However, this easier access to the
court system means that court dockets will include numerous frivolous
lawsuits that consume enormous amounts of time and waste many precious
dollars of innocent defendants. This is particularly pertinent in employment-
reference cases involving allegations of defamation because most employers
378. We note that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts bars a party from providing
immunity for intentional or reckless torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 195 (1979).
379. See, e.g., Stewart v. Sonnebom, 98 U.S. 187, 197 (1879); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82
U.S. 211, 231 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 372 (1851); Arcambel
v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796). For an extensive discussion of the American
Rule, see generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).
380. Vargo, supra note 379, at 1597.
381. In England, 99% of cases are settled before they go to trial; no doubt a reflection
of the fear of paying attorney fees. Id. at 1612.
382. That is, the attorney receives payment only if the plaintiff wins the lawsuit. In
such a case, the attorney typically recovers a percentage of the damages.
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eventually prevail, albeit often at great expense.
3n
Despite its time-honored tradition, the American Rule has not gone
unchallenged 4.3 1 In recent years, it has come under attack in the employ-
ment-reference context.3 Professor Saxton offers a thoughtful proposal.
Briefly summarized, Saxton would permit a prevailing plaintiff to recover
attorney fees and expenses in cases in which the factfinder determined that
the defendant disseminated false and derogatory reference information about
the plaintiff and that, in disseminating the false information, the defendant
forfeited the qualified privilege that would normally apply.8 6 Conversely,
Saxton would authorize a prevailing defendant to recover attorney fees and
expenses when the factfinder determined that the employment reference
which gave rise to the plaintiff's complaint was substantially true and not
false in any material respect .3  Although we favor Saxton's proposal
insofar as it offers defendant employers a carefully and narrowly drawn
opportunity for recovering attorney fees, we remain unconvinced that
offering prevailing plaintiffs attorney fees, except in the narrowest of
circumstances, improves the current situation significantly. We realize
that an asymmetrical approach in which one side of the litigation has a
383. See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
384. By one count, over 200 federal statutes and roughly 2000 state statutes permit fee-
shifting in particular types of litigation. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 102 (identifying
several commentators and studies of fee-shifting in United States). Among the federal
statutes in which fee-shifting is authorized are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994);
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994); and the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1994).
385. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 226, at 336 (endorsing limited fee-shifting in
instances when plaintiff could demonstrate actual malice on part of defendant); Barrett,
supra note 317, at 850-51 (arguing that declaratory judgment proposals in libel actions
should include fee-shifting because it "provides the dual benefits of making deserving
plaintiffs whole and discouraging frivolous suits"); Saxton, supra note 2, at 99-107 (propos-
ing rule "that would allow litigants, in particular circumstances, to recover their reasonable
attorney fees and expenses if they prevail in litigation over an employment reference").
386. See Saxton, supra note 2, at 100. The qualified privilege would most likely be
lost as a result of excessive publication.
387. Id. Saxton would not support awarding attorney fees in cases in which the
defendant prevailed because of the qualified privilege: "In other words, the defendant could
not recover attorneys' fees and expenses from the plaintiff if the factfinder determined
that the reference that gave rise to the litigation was false and defamatcry, but the factfinder
also found that the defendant employer did not abuse and forfeit the qualified privilege."
Id.
388. We would make an exception in the event that a plaintiff offered to resolve a case
through an administrative ADR proceeding and the defendant refused. See infra note 410
and accompanying text.
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disproportionate opportunity for attorney fees appears unfair, but we feel
confident that it is not. First, we are reluctant to create additional incen-
tives for plaintiffs to file tort suits, particularly when we hope to encourage
aggrieved parties to seek an administrative remedy as an alternative to
litigation.389 Second, we think that most potential plaintiffs with meritorious
cases have little trouble finding attorneys to bring cases for them on a
contingency basis."g Third, we suspect that many plaintiffs already unoffi-
cially receive attorney fees from juries through the imposition of either
large compensatory damage awards or punitive damages. Permitting the
recovery of attorney fees on a separate basis might produce double recover-
ies for plaintiffs. Accordingly, to the extent that we support fee-shifting in
employment-reference cases, we do so only in the limited instance in which
a defendant has demonstrated the truth and appropriate disclosure of the
information he or she shared with a prospective employer.391 Moreover,
to protect unsuccessful plaintiffs, we would provide substantial discretion
to a judge to refuse attorney fees when the fees would produce substantial
injustice to the plaintiff.
E. Administrative Declaratory Judgments: No Privileges,
Limited Damages
Our final major recommendation is to establish an ADR system in
which disputes are resolved in administrative "trials" wherein defendants
cannot raise constitutional or qualified privileges as defenses and plain-
tiffs can receive only limited damages. Several features of employment-
reference cases make this context unique and appropriate for our recom-
mendation.
389. See infra notes 394-97 and accompanying text.
390. According to Gaffhey, the current system operates like a giant lottery in which
payoffs, although rare, are attractive enough to encourage excessive litigation:
There remains a strong incentive... to sue despite . . . high costs and the high
burden imposed by the fault standard. Although plaintiffs rarely win, those who
do win big. According to one study ending in 1984, the average jury award to
victorious plaintiffs is roughly $80,000 . . . . [T]hese big payoffs no doubt
encourage others who feel defamed to hire an attorney on contingent fee to file
a big-money lawsuit.
Gaffhey, supra note 317, at 606 (citation omitted).
391. We would analogize our proposal to a provision of the Federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (1994), in which the prevailing
defendant, but not the plaintiff, in challenges to physician peer review actions, can recover
attorney fees.
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First, unlike many cases involving defamation charges against the
media, employment-reference claims rarely involve public officials, public
figures, or matters of public interest of the sort that would trigger constitu-
tional concerns. 3" This approach offers a greater opportunity to fashion
appropriate alternatives to the current litigation system.
Second, except in instances involving widespread publication of a nega-
tive job reference,3 93 most employment-reference claims arise in a limited and
relatively private manner. That is, the only parties that play a role typically
are the employee, the former or current employer, and the prospective
employer. Thus, the need for widespread dissemination of a retraction or
correction is greatly reduced.
Third, the damages from a false and defamatory job reference will typ-
ically be of a concrete nature, less prone to speculation than those that arise
in settings that are more public. Arguably, this could produce easier-to-
calculate remedies.
Fourth, time may particularly be of the essence to an employee who is
receiving negative job references that prevent his or her finding new employ-
ment. Accordingly, the employee may be quite amenable to an inexpensive
procedure that quickly resolves his or her challenge to a negative reference.
None of these points guarantees that an administrative alternative to
court litigation will prove successful, but they provide fertile conditions for
developing such an alternative.
392. Professor Ackerman summarizes the constitutional requirements currently applica-
ble to defamation law as follows:
(1) Neither a public official nor a public figure may recover damages for a
statement regarding his or her official or public conduct without proving, with
clear and convincing clarity, that the statement was made with known falsity or
with reckless disregard for truth or falsity (actual malice). (2) No damages may
be recovered by a plaintiff in a defamation action without proof of fault, and
presumed or punitive damages may not be recovered in the absence of actual
malice, unless the defamatory statement is not a matter of public concern. (3) In
an action against a media defendant involving a statement that is a matter of
public concern, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the statement was false.
Ackerman, supra note 226, at 328. The restriction that appears to come the closest to
affecting our recommendation is the restriction on providing for damages in the absence of
a finding of fault. Nonetheless, this rule, which was announced in the cases of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Build-
ers, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), would appear to be generally inapplicable because
employment-reference cases typically do not involve matters of public concern.
393. Volunteering a negative employment reference in a widespread fashion is, of
course, the very action most designed to provoke a lawsuit and least defensible when
challenged. See Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir. 1985).
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1. The Advantages of an ADR Administrative Remedy
We propose an ADR mechanism for resolving employment-reference
claims by employees against their former or current employers. ADR is an
expanding field of procedures and practices that grew out of current dissatis-
faction with the judicial sytem.31' Among the many advantages of the ADR
approach is its ease, simplicity, inexpensiveness, and efficiency,319 In recent
years, new legislation has encouraged ADR programs, especially at the
federal level, 396 and new programs have sprung up throughout the states.397
Accordingly, we recommend an ADR approach to ease the problems cur-
rently attendant to employment-reference issues.
2. A Recommended Approach
We envision an ADR "declaratory judgment" system that would operate
as follows:
First, the ADR system would offer expedited administrative hearings
with nontechnical evidentiary rules, employing arbitrators as the hearing
officers. Under an ADR approach, the principal issue to be decided would
be whether the employment reference was false and defamatory. This would
be a strict liability determination under a preponderance of the evidence
standard. That is, the factf'mder would rule only on the accuracy of the
reference, not on how or why the inaccuracy occurred.398 The factfinder
would not investigate or rule on whether the employer acted in good faith,
reasonably, mistakenly, or maliciously.
394. For an excellent overview of current ADR practice and theory, see ALTERNATIVE
DisPUrE REsOLUTION: PRACrICE AND PERSPECTIVES (Martha A. Matthews ed., BNA Special
Report No. 149, 1990) [hereinafter BNA ADR REPORT].
395. See generally id.
396. At the federal level, Congress has enacted legislation encouraging federal agencies
to use ADR, the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, P.L. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(1990), and the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, P.L. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990), as well
as encouraging federal courts to establish ADR programs, the Judicial Improvement Act,
P.L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
397. The National Center for State Courts estimated in 1988 that about 700 ADR
programs of one kind or another operated in connection with court operations. See BNA
ADR REPORT, supra note 394, at iii.
398. The reason for this is simple. Employees want to have the record corrected as
soon as possible so that they can seek employment without a negative reference hanging
over their heads. Moreover, proving how and why the employer arrived at the mistaken
reference will not increase the employee's damages at all.
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Second, hearing officers would be authorized to make findings that the
job references for the employee were "true,"'399 "false," or "truth or falsity
not determinable. "w
Third, employer-defendants would be barred from raising as a defense
any argument based on legal privileges - constitutional or qualified.
Fourth, employee-plaintiffs would be entitled to recover damages for
specifically identifiable economic losses they could document,4" but would
be barred from recovering any "general," '  "mental anguish," I or "puni-
tive"'  damages. In order to document a claim for damages, the employee-
plaintiff would have to show not only that he or she was unsuccessful in
applying for a job for which a negative reference was supplied, but also that
the failure to gain the offer proximately resulted from the negative
reference.'0
Fifth, discovery would be severely restricted.' It could not occur
399. This would include a finding that the reference was "substantially true." In other
words, a minor point of inaccuracy that would have had little effect in how an employee was
described would not be permitted to affect the tribunal's ruling. For example, an employee
who shows that an employer's accusation that the employee embezzled $150 when, in fact,
the employee had taken only $100 should not be entitled to demand a ruling that the
employer had falsely accused him or her.
400. We mean for the "not determinable" finding to apply mainly to situations in which
an employer has given a broad characterization lacking significant verifiable allegations.
To the extent that the broad characterizations rest upon specific, underlying facts, the
tribunal should seek to determine the accuracy of such facts.
401. Typically, this would be the employee's lost wages.
402. "General" damages, as defined in defamation law, refers to losses sustained that
are normal and usual and that are to be anticipated when a person's reputation is impaired.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904 (1977). They need not be specifically proved.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 116A, at 843 (noting that general damages are of
"peace-of-mind and dignitary nature rather than economic in character . . . [and] are not
readily measurable in monetary terms"). Our approach requires damages to be proved with
specificity.
403. Courts occasionally award "mental anguish" damages. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976). Prosser and Keeton dislikes such damages, see
KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 116A, at 844-45, and we would bar them.
404. The courts increasingly look askance at punitive damage awards, especially in the
case of media defendants. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 116A, at 845.
405. Without such a requirement, an employee who stood no chance of obtaining
employment at a specific job would be able to seek damages based on this lost opportunity.
406. There is no doubt that discovery is one of the chief causes of delay and expense
in the legal system. See, e.g., Illinois Judge Calls for Menu of Alternatives to Help Courts
Fugill Their Traditional Role, in BNA ADR REPORT, supra note 394, at 59, 60 (noting that
judges at both federal and state levels believe that "abuse of the discovery process is the
most important cause of delay in litigation and of excessive costs").
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without the consent of the hearing officer, who would be directed to discour-
age discovery to the greatest extent possible.4°7
Sixth, expeditiousness would be stressed throughout the process.
Hearing officers would be assigned quickly upon the docketing of a case in
the administrative tribunal. Decisions would be mandatory within a certain
deadline, perhaps within nine months of the commencement of the action. 4°1.
Seventh, either party could request an expedited ADR hearing in lieu of
a trial in court. In the event that the plaintiff offered to resolve the dispute
in an ADR administrative proceeding and the defendant refused, the plaintiff,
if successful at trial, would be entitled to recover reasonable attornqy fees
from the defendant. 409 If the defendant offered to resolve the dispute in an
ADR administrative proceeding and the plaintiff refused, the defendant, if
successful at trial, would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees from
the plaintiff.
410
Eighth, in the event that neither party sought an ADR administrative
proceeding, the case would proceed to litigation with the qualified privilege
we have proposed applying to the lawsuit.4 '
407. We borrow this portion of our proposal from the approach currently administered
in the Court Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) in the state of Hawaii. See Hawaii's
Court-Annexed Arbitration Evaluation Is First to Show Cost Reduction to Litigants, in BNA
ADR REPORT, supra note 394, at 73.
408. Hawaii's CAAP requires a determination within nine months. Id. at 75. Approxi-
mately three-quarters of the CAAP cases meet this deadline. Id.
409. This is the one limited instance in which we would support the right of a plaintiff
to seek attorney fees from the defendant. We do so to provide a strong incentive to
defendants to use the ADR administrative approach rather than to litigate in court.
410. In this instance, we would provide for reasonable attorney fees not just in the event
that the defendant prevailed upon the truth or falsity of the job reference, but on any
ground, including privilege. This approach contrasts with our views relating to the reform
of qualified privilege. See supra notes 379-91 and accompanying text. We do so both
because we wish to encourage the parties to use the ADR administrative procedures, and
also because the plaintiff will have been given an opportunity in an ADR setting to establish
the truth or falsity of the job reference and will have been rebuffed.
411. We note that, if a court wished, it could adopt the "Sofaer" test used by Judge
Abraham Softer in the Ariel Sharon libel trial against Time magazine. See Wissler, supra
note 227, at 474. In the Sharon trial, the judge instructed the jury to reach separate verdicts
on whether the challenged statement was defamatory, whether the statement was false, and,
finally, on whether the statement was published with actual malice. The advantage of such
an approach is that the plaintiff could get a determination on truth or falsity even if he or
she is denied damages because no actual malice could be demonstrated. The disadvantage
is that trials conducted under such an approach would be very expensive and time-consuming
because summary judgment on qualified or constitutional privilege would not be available
and full discovery rights would apply.
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F. Summary of Recommendations
In summary, having explored a number of issues that revolve around
the difficulties employers have in providing employment references, we
take the following positions with respect to reforming the law.
1. We do not recommend imposing a common-law or statutory duty
on employers to provide employment references when queried by prospec-
tive employers. At most, we support an extremely limited duty in instances
in which an employer has acquired confidential information that a former
employee imminently plans to assault a readily identifiable victim or class
of victims.
2. We recommend adoption of federal legislation to establish a quali-
fied privilege for employers to provide employment references as follows:
An employer that discloses information about the job performance
of an employee or former employee at the request of a prospective
employer (or at the request of the employee or former employee) shall
not be civilly liable for any harm caused by such disclosure unless the
employee or former employee demonstrates by clear and convincing
evidence that:
(1) the information disclosed was false and defamatory,
(2) the information disclosed was acted upon by the prospective
employer in a manner that caused harm to the employee or former
employee, and
(3) the employer knew the information was false or acted with
reckless disregard of the information's truth or falsity.
3. We do not recommend expanding employer rights to enter into
contractual waivers of liability with employees.
4. We recommend a modest expansion of the right to attorney fees for
prevailing parties in employment-reference cases: (a) for parties that prevail
in court after having offered to resolve cases in an administrative ADR
proceeding and having been rebuffed by the other side and (b) for employ-
ers that prevail in court when neither side offers to resolve an employment-
reference dispute in court.
5. We recommend the establishment of an ADR mechanism for
resolving employment-reference claims. The ADR system would operate
informally, without significant discovery rights, without qualified (or other)
privileges, and with limited damages. In return, it would offer expeditious
and cost-efficient decisions declaring whether an employer's references
were accurate.
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IX. Conclusion
The issues relating to employment references are many and multi-
faceted. Because they involve the delicate balance among employers,
employees, prospective employers, co-workers, and members of the public
generally, easy solutions seem unattainable. Moreover, because reform
requires readjustments of the parties' rights and expectations, change is
likely to come only after extensive debate and reflection. Because of this,
we hold no high hopes that our proposals will prevail in any short-run time
frame. On the other hand, we urge all concerned, including those with
conflicting interests, to assess whether the current situation is tolerable for
anyone. We particularly question whether the recent state initiatives, upon
close inspection, do much to alleviate the current problem.412 We think
they do not, and we reiterate our sense that action at the federal level to
address the problem is vastly to be preferred.
412. See supra notes 331-43 and accompanying text.
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